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ABSTRACT
THE POLITICS OF NAÏVE INTEGRATIONISM:
COMMUNITY INTEGRATION FOR DISABLED PEOPLE AND THE PROMISES OF
OLMSTEAD
Heather Swadley
Rogers Smith
Are disabled people “better off” in segregated or integrated settings? This question
serves as a source of frequent tension between non-disabled academics and disability
rights activists, the former often arguing for segregated service provision and the latter
championing integration. This project argues that this supposed choice is a false
dichotomy—it is a choice between fully supportive segregated services and what I call
“naïve integration.” Naïve integration is a governmental policy posture that
presumptively integrates disabled people while simultaneously failing to provide the
community supports and accessibility features necessary to allow them to thrive. The
reason integration is perceived as a policy failure is that the federal government, as well
as state and municipal governments, all too frequently integrate disabled people in a
naïve manner. I argue for a radical reimagination of what it means to integrate disabled
people into their communities. Utilizing insights from political science, sociology, public
policy, and law, I suggest that naïve integration may be overcome through a strategy of
creative litigation and systemic policy changes inspired by Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act’s Olmstead mandate. I explore how the fields of housing, education, and
employment could be impacted by a more robust understanding of Olmstead’s
presumption toward service provision in community-based settings.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
“People, irrespective of their degree of disability, are apt to do better in the community
on most measures and do no worse when it comes to challenging behaviors… Very
simply, the institution cannot replace the community in providing individuals… with the
opportunities for the good life.”
-Raymond Lemay
“[J]ustice requires social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to
interact with one another as peers.”
-Nancy Fraser
“The criticism of power wielded over the mentally sick or mad cannot be restricted to
psychiatric institutions; nor can those questioning the power to punish be content with
denouncing prisons as total institutions. The question is: How are such relations of
power rationalized? Asking this is the only way to avoid other institutions, with the same
objectives and the same effects, from taking their stead.”
-Michel Foucault
1. Introduction
The relationship between integration and disability justice is highly contested. Are
disabled people1 “better off” when they receive supportive services in segregated

I generally make the deliberate decision in this project to use “identity-first” as opposed
to “person-first” language, i.e., disabled people, not people with disabilities. Although
individual disabled persons differ in terms of personal preference, there is a strong case to
be made that the arguments behind “person-first” language are flawed. First, many
disabled persons view their disability as a major aspect of their identity, and thus,
distancing disabled persons from their disability linguistically may be inimical to the
process of self-identification for disabled persons. Second, the implicit assumption
behind ‘person-first’ language is that there is something dehumanizing about
acknowledging that someone is disabled. This reinforces the highly problematic and
pervasive narrative that disabilities are in some way deficiencies in personhood or that
having a disability makes someone less human. Therefore, for political reasons, I use the
category disabled person; however, I acknowledge that the decision about how to selfidentify is contentious and the prerogative of individual disabled people.
1

2
settings?2 Disability activists have tended to answer this question with a resounding “no.”
Armed with the rallying cry of “nothing about us without us,” disabled activists have
fought for inclusion in the public sphere in many forms—whether through
deinstitutionalization and the independent living movement, the push for integrated
education, or competitive, integrated employment (See, e.g., Pelka 2012; Fleischer and
Zames 2011; Shapiro 1994). However, some academics argue that integration does not
always produce substantive equality for disabled people (See, e.g., Colker 2008).
This project both supports the claims of disability activists and disputes many
conventional claims that disabled people are “better off” in segregated settings. Claims
that disabled people are “better off” in segregated settings usually do not include
integration as a metric for determining what constitutes “better off.” The purpose of this
project is to suggest that integration is one of the outcomes that should be measured when
assessing whether a disabled person is “better off.” This is both for genealogical and
normative reasons. Historically, disabled people have been cut off from society and
placed in segregated settings, making the maintenance of these settings an operative

2

I make the conscious choice to refer to settings as segregated or integrated, rather than
to refer to “special needs” or other categories that imply disabled peoples’ needs are
exceptional, rather than examples of the variance that inevitably surround any putative
norm. Saying that a setting is segregated is more accurate and also avoids the use of
stigmatizing language, generally considered offensive to the disability community, such
as “special needs.”
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feature of ableism.3 Moreover, the maintenance of segregated settings for disabled people
harms their ability to participate equally in social benefits and perpetuates ableism. The
fundamental contention of this project is that the problems people articulate with
integration are generally problems with naïve integration, or integration that is carried
out improperly, without the necessary supports, programs, or accommodations.
This chapter begins by outlining the key legal concepts at play in this project. I
then provide a brief history of the segregation of disabled people, arguing that the
impulse to segregate perpetuates the apparatus of ableism. I argue that even seemingly
benign instances of segregation deny disabled people the opportunity to interact with
nondisabled people as peers. Therefore, segregation denies participatory parity. I
conclude by outlining the essential thesis of this project, which this the view that naïve
integrationism is to blame for many of the seemingly problematic features of disability
integration. Naïve integration is not in fact true integration but itself serves to perpetuate
some of the most insidious features of ableism.
2. Disability Law in the United States
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and subsequent Americans with
Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008 prohibit discrimination based on disability. The

3

Ableism has a variety of meanings, but generally, ableism refers to an apparatus
whereby disabled people are placed at a disadvantage to able-bodied, minded, or
neurotypical people. It is discrimination against disabled people, both through overt acts
of prejudice or exclusion but also the exclusion of disabled people from aspects of social
participation through built environments and social prejudices/expectations that render
certain spaces inaccessible. Ableism is therefore the presumption that people are not
disabled, and refers to social apparatuses built around that presumption.
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ADA has been touted as “the emancipation proclamation for persons with disabilities.” 4
The ADA is organized into five titles, with Title I concerning employment, Title II
concerning public entities and transportation, Title III concerning public accommodations
and commercial facilities, Tile IV regulating telecommunications, and a miscellaneous
Title V.5 This project will be focusing primarily on Titles I-III, as well as other disability
rights legislation, including: The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 6 (IDEA) and
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 7
This project will at various points discuss the ways in which the courts have
interpreted these laws. I will make the overarching point that the way these laws have
been interpreted by courts has largely been through a lens of naïve integrationism—that
is to say, courts have required programs to integrate disabled people without requiring the
broader systemic change necessary to create supported integration. Supported integration
entails providing disabled people with the structures and supports necessary to make
social programs and spaces accessible. I will argue that it is possible to move beyond
naïve integration and toward supported integration by innovatively using existing legal
tools—specifically by leveraging the Title II integration mandate, otherwise known as the

See e.g. Ted Kennedy’s remarks in the September 14, 1989 Senate debate on the ADA:
135 Cong. Rec. S11173-01.
5 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (2018).
6
See 20 U.S.C. §1400 (2018).
7 See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2018).
4
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Olmstead mandate.8 Although Olmstead will be discussed in more detail in subsequent
chapters, the essential holding of Olmstead is that public entities shall administer
programs, service, and activities to “qualified individual[s] with a disability” in the most
integrated setting appropriate to their needs.9 This includes a mandate to provide
community-based care and treatment to qualified individuals with disabilities when their
health care provider deems it appropriate. 10
The Olmstead opinion has been likened to Brown v. Board of Education for
disabled people (Cerreto 2001).11 Under Olmstead, disabled plaintiffs have successfully
sued prisons, sheltered workshops, hospitals, treatment facilities, and long-term
residential facilities to push for community-based services and public integration
(Matthews 2018). Olmstead litigation is also being used to challenge segregation in
schools.12 This project explores the potential and limitations of Olmstead litigation to
create genuine community integration for disabled people. In what follows, I set out my

8

For more about the Olmstead decision and its ramifications, see Chapter 2 concerning
de-institutionalization. The remaining chapters discuss innovative uses of the Olmstead
mandate as well.
9Olmstead v. L. C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 592 (1999)
10 Id. at 602.
11 Though, this is a fraught argument, as Ben-Moshe (2020) suggests. It ignores the
interplay between race and disability, including the ways in which disability has been and
still is racialized. Saying that Olmstead is the Brown v. Board of Education for disabled
people, in many ways furthers the idea that disabled people are white—that the goals of
disability and racial emancipation can in some sense be separated.
12 See Chapter 3 for a more thorough discussion of the effects of Olmstead on education.
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argument for why integration ought to be preferred to more restrictive, more segregated
solutions.
3. The Impulse to Segregate
Many people make arguments for the segregation of disabled people—their
segregation is often conceptualized as part and parcel of providing disability-specific
services. Parents and caregivers of disabled people have often advocated for segregated
settings.13 Similarly, many advocates who are not themselves mental health consumers
advocate for more in-patient and therefore segregated treatment. 14 These groups are often
criticized as out of touch with the desires of disabled people themselves, however, as
their primary membership consists of parents and caretakers of psychiatrically disabled
people (See Fleischer and Zames 2011, 120). In academia, many scholars advocate for
positions that are unpopular in the disability rights community, despite their personal
relationships with disability. For example, Amber Knight (2016), who is herself
physically disabled, suggests that a wider scope of paternalism for cognitively disabled
people is justified, as does Michael Berube, the father of an intellectually disabled child
(2010).
Eva Feder Kittay, a leading scholar on intellectual disability, lauds that her
daughter Sesha “has been able to flourish because [they] have been able to secure good

13

See e.g. Avi Wolfman-Arent, Segregated and satisfied: parents of special ed students
blanch at calls for inclusion, WHYY (July 27, 2017), https://whyy.org/articles/segregatedand-satisfied-parents-of-special-ed-students-blanch-at-calls-for-inclusion/.
14
See e.g. Psychiatric Bed Shortages, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER (accessed June
17, 2020), https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/key-issues/bed-shortages.
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long-term care… at an excellent residence” (2013, 69). Indeed, Kittay criticizes
community integration in the status quo, stating that “[w]hen unaccompanied by support,
efforts on the part of the disability community to allow disabled children and adults to
remain in their community mean that the care falls squarely and exclusively on the
shoulders of (usually female) family members” (2013, 69). Although Sesha’s group home
is by no means typical of the institutions discussed in Chapter 2, and Sesha’s impairments
are severe, I will argue that seeing segregated settings as inevitable for people like Sesha
displays a lack of imagination, in addition to presenting a false dichotomy—that her
needs must be met by female caretakers in a system not designed for parents of children
like Sesha, or she must be placed in a segregated setting.
Ruth Colker (2008) argues that equality is a function of ending relationships and
subordination of disabled persons—that is, ending structural ableism. However, for
Colker, integrationist policies have not helped the cause of disability justice in most
circumstances and have, in some ways, hindered it. She suggests that “formal equality
mantras like ‘The Constitution is color blind’ or ‘Separate is inherently unequal’ are too
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simplistic to serve as the foundation for effective social policy” (2008, 38). 15 She further
argues:
Although an integrationist perspective played an important historical and
structural role in helping to close some horrendous disability-only institutions, it
fails to recognize that the government may need to retain some disability-only
services and institutions for those who need or want them while protecting others
from being coercively required to accept such services or being placed in such
institutions. An absolutist integrationist perspective disserves the disability
community by supporting an inappropriately high threshold for the development
and retention of disability-only services and institutions” (2008, 10).
Colker admits that integration is an important tool for achieving substantive equality for
disabled persons, yet does not view it as an end in itself.
While I sympathize with the claims of those who argue that integration has not
always produced the most just results, I am not convinced that substantive equality or
justice require abandoning integration as an “end in itself.” Rather, my claim is that
integration is a desirable end in itself—it is both a tool for bringing about disability
justice and a constitutive element of disability justice. Indeed, community integration is
vital to the project of deconstructing the historical subordination experienced by disabled

15

This project takes issue with the conflation of these two types of statements—I would
argue that saying separate is unequal may either be interpreted from an anti-subordination
or an anti-classification lens, whereas saying that “The Constitution is color blind”
implies that any classification is itself unequal. It is possible to maintain that separate is
unequal without adhering to an anti-classification theory of constitutional rights.
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persons. Forcible segregation has been a primary vehicle through which the oppression of
disabled people has been enacted, whether through institutions, separate classrooms, or
sheltered workshops.16 More subtly, but no less insidiously, some disabled persons’
preferences toward segregated environments (which Colker discusses) might very well be
shaped by the hostility they face in integrated environments—exclusionary environments
are by their nature alienating. The problem therefore could be that integrated
environments are not properly designed. My fundamental argument is that providing
disability-specific services does not require segregated environments. Rather, supportive
services can and should operate in the public sphere such as to increase the integration of
disabled people. Opening the public sphere to disabled people is a vital element of ending
their subordination.17
Nonetheless, while integration is part and parcel of the fight for substantive
equality, integration does not itself produce disability justice. The policy of naïve
integrationism pursued by the United States Government, as well as state and municipal

16

Although Colker recognizes the problems inherent to forcibly segregating disabled
persons from the rest of society, there is a real danger that abandoning integrationism as a
primary goal of disability advocates will lead to forcible segregation or lead to the de
facto segregation of individuals who have the capacity to flourish in an integrated setting,
provided the appropriate tools are made available. Under my view, it is naïve
integrationism that is the problem, rather than integrationist tendencies themselves.
17 This does not mean that all disabled people must take part in integrated
environments—for example, culturally Deaf communities resist being lumped in with the
rest of the disability community and resist community integration. This is a perfectly
valid response to decades of subordination. However, I would also argue that this is a
view held by a small segment of the disability community, rather than the vast majority.
Moreover, this does not negate the need for governmental policies to create inclusive,
integrated environments.
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governments, has in many ways hindered the fight for disability justice. This project
seeks to provide a position beyond naïve integrationism. In the following section, I
outline some of the normative assumptions underlying this project—namely a non-ideal
approach to justice and the idea of participatory parity.
4. Fundamental Principles: A Non-Ideal Participatory Parity
Two normative principles drive this project—first, is the idea that the principles
of justice cannot be determined in a vacuum. Justice must consider the non-ideal
conditions in which we live. Second, justice requires participatory parity, or the
conditions under which adult members of society can interact with one another as equals.
I will discuss each in turn, highlighting these assumptions’ implications for the
conception of disability justice advanced. While it is beyond the scope of this project to
provide full justification for each of these foundational principles, I will also provide a
prima facie argument for each.

4.1 Justice in a Non-Ideal World
Scholars have frequently critiqued “ideal theory.” Ideal theory refers to three
distinct but interrelated assumptions— (1) the assumption of full compliance as opposed
to partial compliance with principles of justice; (2) the idea that the principles of justice
must be determined under unbiased conditions; and (3) the assumption that justice is an
“end-state” principle, as opposed to a transitional principle—that we should be aiming for
a full theory of justice rather than an incremental one (Valentini 2012). This project
critiques ideal theory in all its variations, asserting that we must take the world as it is
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when determining a just course of action. Justice is, in this sense, contingent on the
conditions in which we find ourselves.
Why would this project adopt a non-ideal conception of justice—is it not better to
articulate principles of justice that hold under all conditions, that create an ideal to which
to strive? Is seeking utopia in some form not the goal of political theorizing? My
response is two-fold: first, ideal theory is nonrealistic and ill-suited to the world in which
we live and about which we are theorizing. Second, ideal theory harms oppressed groups.
It is, as Charles Mills (2005) argues, ideological.
Mills admits that to some extent, normative theory is “ideal.” It concerns itself
with what ought to be done and makes prescriptions based upon some conception of what
is better. However, Mills objects to making idealized assumptions about the world when
constructing these ideal theories—“ideal-as-model” (2005, 166). Idealized theory makes
assumptions about how the world works in order to “simplify” ethical theory. In doing
this, it makes critical assumptions about what human beings are like by abstracting away
from real-world conditions. In a push to create an idealized social ontology, ideal
theorists “will abstract away from relations of structural domination, exploitation,
coercion, and oppression” (Mills 2005, 168). Moreover, ideal theorists frequently idealize
human capacities—assuming that everyone is a “free” and “equal” participant in society
whose capacities fall within a “normal range” to quote Rawls (1985; 1993). Ideal
theorists will ignore how society actually works for a model of how they think it ought to
work. As a result, ideal theorists will frequently be silent on oppression—indeed, in the
Rawlsian Original Position, people are unaware of historical conditions of oppression like

12
structural racism or disability injustice. It is for these reasons that ideal theory is
ideological.
There is no view from nowhere, as Iris Marion Young (1990) argues—knowledge
is perspectival. Mills asserts that ideal theory abstracts away from the actual power
relations we are seeking to deconstruct. Mills notes, “It is no accident that historically
subordinated groups have always been deeply skeptical of ideal theory, generally see its
glittering ideals as remote and unhelpful, and are attracted to nonideal theory, or what
significantly overlaps it” (2005, 170). Ideal theory is ideological in that it tends to distort
reality and favor the reality of a few—the few being middle-to-upper-class, white,
nondisabled males. Ideal theory explicitly serves the interests of the privileged by
disavowing the needs and very existence of the people on which theories of justice should
focus and for which these theories ought to provide answers.
This neglect of “complicated” real-world conditions like racial injustices and
disability has tangible consequences for how ideal theorists view the world. For example,
traditional Rawlsian ideal theory18 ignores the very existence of disabled people (1993).19

18

Indeed, the Original Position is arguably the exemplar for what ideal theory is.
Although parties in the original position are unaware of exactly where they fall in
terms of cognitive abilities, they are aware that their capacities fall within a “normal
range,” (1985, 21) seeming to suggest from the outset that Rawls does not view persons
with cognitive impairments capable of participating in or representing themselves in the
original position. In Political Liberalism, Rawls goes on to explicitly state: “But given
our aim, I put aside for the time being these temporary disabilities and also permanent
disabilities or mental disorders so severe as to prevent people from being cooperating
members of society in the usual sense. Thus, while we begin with an idea of the person
implicit in the public political culture, we idealize and simplify this idea in various ways
in order to focus first on the main question” (1993, 20).
19
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The specification that agents in the Original Position fall within a “normal range” of
intelligence, according to Simplican, leads to what she terms a double disavowal of
disability in early Rawlsian thought. First, persons with cognitive disabilities are absent
from the decision-making procedure that determines what the principles of justice are and
therefore are left in a precarious position when those principles are decided. This
simultaneously leads to a second disavowal of disability. Because contractors within the
Original Position do not have specific knowledge about the treatment of people with
intellectual disabilities under non-ideal conditions, “they are unaware of societal
prejudice, built barriers, failures in long-term care, and the spatial segregation of people
with disability” (2015, 75). This “constructs people with intellectual disabilities as
peripheral to matters of justice and abnormal to human functioning” (2015, 76). Because
disabled people are not included in the range of functioning considered by persons in the
Original Position and because all knowledge of the plight of disabled people is
decontextualized, persons with mild to severe intellectual, psychiatric and psycho-social
disabilities are excluded from the Original Position at the outset. This seems immediately
curious and troubling for a theory that intends to address the plight of the least
advantaged and strives to create conditions of justice that are universal in any meaningful
sense.
Of course, Rawlsian ideal theory is only one example of ideal theory; however,
the basic criticism applies to ideal theory in any of the senses Valentini (2012) describes.
When one assumes full compliance with the principles of justice, one does not consider
the multitudes of ways in which people do not comply with these principles. Therefore, it
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is easy to gloss over the real suffering perpetuated by people who do not act accordingly
with principles of justice. Likewise, the assumption of utopian conditions distracts us
from the realities of injustice—in the real world, people are not treated unjustly because
they conform with idealized standards of personhood but rather because they deviate
from them. Finally, ideal theory that tries to seek an abstract, “complete” theory of justice
might neglect tangible improvements that can be made in people’s lives should a more
incremental view of justice be taken.
It is for these reasons that this project embraces a non-ideal vantage point. I
recognize that the arguments I am making may not be universal—they may very well be
contingent. However, injustice is itself a contingency—deconstructing oppression
requires attention to the circumstances that allow such oppression to happen in the first
instance. The arguments I’m making might not apply in a utopian world where no one is
disadvantaged due to their disability. Nonetheless, they apply now, in this world, to make
society a more just place for disabled people.
4.2 Participatory Parity
The second principle driving this project is the idea of participatory parity.
Participatory parity, a phrase popularized by Nancy Fraser, can be boiled down to the
simple idea that: “justice requires social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of
society to interact with one another as peers” (1998, 30). Participatory parity requires
formal legal equality, though not necessarily uniformity, as well as both material and
intersubjective conditions—that is, justice requires proper distribution of social benefits
as well as mutual recognition by other people as peers. In an earlier paper on democratic

15
theory, I add a third condition to this idea—that society be accessible and “enabling”,
incorporating the principle of embracing difference central to disability politics into the
idea of participatory parity (Swadley 2016). As in that paper, the model of participatory
parity and justice advanced by this paper is necessarily partial. Articulating a full-fledged
theory of participatory parity and social inclusion is a lofty goal that cannot be achieved
within the confines of a dissertation segment.
The idea that people ought to be able to participate socially on an equal basis is
foundational to contemporary theories of justice. Participatory parity to some extent
drives both distributive and recognition-based theories of justice—both seem to embrace
the end goal of social inclusion, of a society of peers. Oppression-based theories, like
Young’s (1990) also generally seek social inclusion as a primary aim of justice.
Participatory parity encompasses the full spectrum of features that we expect to be
present in a theory of justice. A society cannot be just if it denies people the ability to
equally participate based on maldistribution. A society cannot be just if it denies people
the ability to equally participate because of misrecognition or disparate treatment, and a
society cannot be just if people are not able to access the spaces in which decisions are
made and social lives are lived. Therefore, participatory parity is a central consideration
in this project. If people cannot participate as equals because of domination, oppression,
exploitation, maldistribution, inaccessibility, or misrecognition, they are not being given
their due or treated justly.
It may be that participatory parity is an untenable or unrealizable goal. For
example, Kevin Olson (2008) argues that participatory parity creates a paradox of
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enablement—those who need participatory parity are the least likely to have it, even
though theories of participatory parity presuppose these people have participatory parity
by assuming that oppressed groups can enact it themselves. It may therefore be the case
that participatory parity, in its purest form, is unrealizable. I sidestep this problem by,
unlike Fraser, suggesting that participatory parity is not the only, or even primary
criterion of justice. If we view ending oppression and domination more generally as the
goal of justice theorizing (as Young 1990; 2000 does), maximizing participatory parity
seems to follow as one normative requirement. Even if it is an unrealizable ideal, I would
argue maximizing participatory parity ought to be a goal of any just society due to the
adverse ethical implications associated with its absence (which Olson himself
recognizes). Finally, if we subscribe to a more transitional theory of justice, it need not be
a problem that full participatory parity is unrealizable—only that maximizing
participatory parity alters existing social arrangements such that they are more just.
In this project, I will argue that what scholars call the integration presumption is
vital to ensuring participatory parity. This is for multiple reasons. First, the genealogy of
disability demonstrates that seclusion and separation have traditionally been the primary
vehicles through which disability discrimination has occurred. Moreover, the ill effects of
segregation carry into the present—government-sanctioned segregation of disabled
people leads to a failure to properly distribute goods and benefits in society. Finally,
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government-sanctioned segregation reinforces the idea that disability is not meant to be
public—that people with disabilities do not belong in social spaces.20
In the sections that follow, I outline reasons that integration must be part of the
calculus for determining whether disabled citizens are being treated as political peers;
yet, I conclude that federal disability policy has pursued integration poorly. That said, the
situation is not as bleak as it may seem—existing disability law, leveraged properly by
activists, provides the tools necessary to ensure that disabled people receive the services
they need in their communities.
5. Why is separate unjust? A brief genealogy of the ableist roots of disability
segregation
Throughout American political development, disabled people have been excluded
from public life and public spaces. This section and project do not attempt to provide a
complete chronology of disability exclusion throughout history. I merely seek to argue
that the abuses suffered by disabled people historically are relevant to current
assessments of segregated vs. integrated settings. The history of exclusion faced by
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Many of these arguments are indeed contingent—it is possible, for example, to imagine
better, segregated systems. However, my response would be two-fold: (1) realizing what
I call true integration is a prerequisite to providing a meaningful choice between
integrated settings and segregated settings for disabled people, and (2) I am not taking
issue with individual disabled people deciding that they want to pursue their lives in
segregated settings, but rather am taking issue with the government prioritizing or
facilitating solely segregated settings.
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disabled people has been well-documented in other projects 21 and is relevant to but not
the focal point of the current discussion.
The first institutions for disabled people emerged in the mid-1800s. Reformers,
like Dorothea Dix attempted to make institutions places of reform rather than places of
segregation or punishment (See Foucault 1975; Dix qtd. in Am. J. Public Health 2006).
The first state-run residential “schools” for disabled people were intended to be
therapeutic in nature and were responses to perceived abuses against disabled people by
their families, who often locked them in basements, holding pens, and almshouses.
Although the earliest institutions were viewed as temporary measures and emphasized
rehabilitation, these principles were quickly discarded in the wake of the eugenics
movement, which began in the late 19th Century—“instead of being a means to an end,
incarceration in the mid-nineteenth century became an end in itself” (Chapman et al.
2014, 8).
The eugenics movement, a pivotal driving force in late-Nineteenth to early
Twentieth Century politics, positioned disabled persons as unfit for participation in public
life. Eugenicists advocated for the segregation of ‘feebleminded’ people from society writ
large. The term eugenics was coined by Sir Francis Galton in his 1883 book Essays on
Eugenics and refers to concerted attempts to rid society of those deemed to deviate from
standards of genetic and social perfection. ‘Feeblemindedness’ during the early twentieth

See e.g. Downey and Conroy (2020); Carey (2009); O’Brien (2013); Nielsen (2012);
Murphy (2011); Chapman, Cary, and Ben-Moshe (2014); Foucault (1964); Pelka (2012);
Schweik (2009); Shapiro (2011).
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century was treated as a pressing public health concern, cast as an epidemic. The
‘feebleminded’ were considered the “most prolific and potentially most dangerous”
pathologized subset of the population, and experts estimated that ‘idiocy’ had grown by
200 per cent in the early 1900s (Carey 2009, 56-57). 30-40 per cent of the population
were believed to be feebleminded, and there were strong intersections between race,
gender, class and feeblemindedness (Carey 2009, 63). A dual relationship existed
between poverty and intellectual disability, with intellectual disability said to cause
poverty and those who were impoverished viewed as more likely to become disabled.
Keeping disabled people in institutional custody became a way to study the growing
“epidemic” of “feeblemindedness,” to protect society from it—both by protecting society
from people currently deemed “feebleminded” and against future procreation by the
“feebleminded.”22
The dependence of intellectually disabled persons on social support was viewed
as a reason for excluding them from public life, with eugenicists advocating for
institutionalization, typically on public safety grounds. However, institutionalization
made people even more dependent on the state and therefore less deserving of the
traditional rights of citizenship in the eyes of their communities. The tax burden imposed
by intellectually disabled persons in institutions was frequently used to justify their
continued exclusion from important rights, including not only the right to vote, but even
the right to occupy public spaces. For example, in Buck v. Bell, Oliver Wendell Holmes
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Jr. controversially stated that those who “sap the strength of the state” ought to sacrifice
certain rights (such as fertility) 23 in order to keep the nation from being “swamped with
incompetence.”24
Contemporaneously, local precincts across the country enacted laws prohibiting
unsightly (often interpreted as disabled) persons from appearing in public. The most
famous of these statutes was Chicago’s. The city passed an ordinance banning anyone
who was “diseased, maimed, mutilated, or in any way deformed, so as to be an unsightly
or disgusting object” from appearing in the “public view.” A further part of the statute
read:
Whereas the streets and sidewalks of the City of Chicago contain numerous
beggars, mendicants, organ-grinders and other unsightly and unseemly objects,
which are a reproach to the City, disagreeable to people upon the streets, an
offense to business houses along the streets and often dangerous, Therefore be it
ordered, That the mayor at once take steps to remove from the streets all beggars,
mendicants, and all those who by way of making Exhibition of themselves and
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It is estimated that by the 1970s, at least 63,000 Americans were sterilized without
their consent, though many more incidents likely went unreported (Pelka 2012, 11).
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their infirmaries seek to obtain money from people on and along the streets (qtd.
in Schweik 2009).
The last of these statutes was not repealed until the 1980s, and the last recorded
conviction occurred in 1974. The eugenics movement combined with the impulse to keep
disabled people out of the public eye (and therefore public life) coalesced to bring into
being institutions to house disabled people.
Initially, institutions were viewed as a mechanism of rehabilitation. By the mid1800s, reformers attempted to make institutions places of reform, rather than places of
mere segregation or punishment (See Foucault 1975). People deemed unfit for social life
were confined out of a desire to bring them into line with social principles—the impetus
was to reform rather than to confine or punish (See Foucault 1975; Chapman et al. 2014).
Although the earliest institutions were viewed as temporary measures and emphasized
rehabilitation, however, these principles were quickly discarded in the wake of the
eugenics movement (Chapman et al. 2014, 8). Keeping disabled people in institutional
custody became a way to study the growing “epidemic” of “feeblemindedness,” to
protect society from it—both by protecting society from people currently deemed
“feebleminded” and against future procreation by the “feebleminded.” 25
The purpose of this project is not to catalogue the history of institutions and their
abuses—as this work has already been done, but rather to build upon this work through a
historically-situated understanding of disability justice. Because the rampant abuse within
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these institutions first became a topic of interest in the mid Twentieth Century, this
section will discuss the state of institutions circa 1960-1970. First, institutions did not
provide any modicum of rehabilitation but rather subjected disabled people to permanent
social exclusion—betraying their original rehabilitative aims. Moreover, abuse was
rampant in these institutions. Institutionalized people were frequently kept in cages,
subjected to unsanitary conditions, and were abused by staff. For example, an
investigation by the Department of Justice revealed a systematic pattern of patient abuse
in Pennhurst State School, with nine workers indicted for beating and abusing patients. 26
Due to inadequate staffing at Pennhurst, restraints were frequently used to control
patients, and psychotropic medication was used for control rather than treatment. There
was frequently excrement and urine on the ward floors, and outbreaks of pinworms and
infectious diseases were common. 27
These abuses were not isolated to Pennhurst but were rather endemic to mass,
state-run institutions. Pelka argues that “[b]y the mid-twentieth century, this institutional
system had grown into an insular and extensive disability gulag” (2012, 49). Speaking
about a visit to Letchworth Village Institution in New York in 1938, Gunnar Dybwad, a
social work reformist, stated: “On one adult ward I saw incontinent ‘untidy’ men laying
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in boxes of sawdust” (qtd. in Pelka 2012, 50). Dybwad notes that parents were not
allowed to visit their institutionalized children. Moreover:
[R]esidents had minimal services. They were let loose in these day rooms, and of
course, weaker ones were continually abused—sexually abused, and so on… I
made the statement that you couldn’t possibly speak of “custodial care”—that was
a famous statement by me—because “custody”, in the minimum, implied a sense
of safety and security, and nobody in that institution was safe and secure (Dybwad
qtd. in Pelka 2012, 52-53).
The abuses of residential facilities, the full documentation of which are beyond the scope
of this project, are important to understanding the genealogy of disability segregation—
and the necessity of disability integration. Disability segregation was borne out of an
ableist, eugenic impulse to isolate, segregate, and ultimately eliminate disabled people
from society writ large. Genealogy is an important tool for interrogating the reasons why
we view certain social arrangements as desirable and ultimately inevitable—not to
mention that abusive institutions, practices, and eugenics remain rampant in the status
quo.
One of the central aims of critical disability theory is to “identify and defy
practices that contribute to the prevailing cluster of assumptions that produces these
pernicious effects” (Tremain 2017, 3). Just as Tremain uses genealogies of disability to
“denaturalize” and “debiologize” disability as a philosophical concept, I too argue that
the genealogy of disability exclusion is an important way to denaturalize the idea of
disability segregation and to shed light on its injustices. By shedding light on the
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contingency of the current status of disability service provision, I seek to articulate
alternative modes of providing such services. I seek to interrogate why exactly we 28 are
inclined to think that disability-specific services cannot be provided in integrated settings.
Why do some disabled people prefer to be in segregated settings—is this inherent, or is it
a byproduct of ableism? To what extent does the exclusive provision of disability-specific
services in segregated settings inform peoples’ belief that segregated settings are
inherently better? Integrated and segregated settings are not themselves “good” or “evil,”
but rather meaning is imputed upon these systems, and power structures are built around
the meaning we impute to them. The goal of this project is to note how these power
systems operate and to demonstrate that a different political future is imaginable.
6. The Injustice of Disability Segregation
The pervasive history of segregating disabled people provides context for the
injustices disabled people continue to face and reveals the political contingency of
separate service provision. However, segregation perpetuates the apparatus of ableism in
several concrete ways, which will be discussed in this section.
6.1 Anxiety Surrounding Disability and Ableist Segregation
Disability invokes an entrenched sense of anxiety for many, including people who
view themselves to be advocates for disabled people (Simplican 2015). This anxiety is

I use the “editorial we” and terms such as “ours” to demonstrate broad social
ownership of the collective anxiety surrounding disability. Because ableism is such a
pervasive apparatus, a disavowal of disability anxiety is impossible for anyone, disabled
or nondisabled, or anywhere between.
28
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both aesthetic and existential—most people are socially conditioned to fear bodily
difference and perceived failures to attain certain levels of capacity, and people often
experience existential anxiety because the existence of disability serves as a reminder that
we are vulnerable. Disability might at any point “erode human capacities that are
essential to flourishing and human relationships” (Simplican 2015, 3). Simplican argues
that these entrenched anxieties are also political—society idealizes a certain form of
democratic participation that reveals a “deep discrepancy between the ways we
conceptualize the demands of political participation and the actual range of ways people
act politically” (Simplican 2015, 3). For example, society tends to idealize the rational,
independent actor, when many disability scholars (See, e.g., Kittay and Carlson 2010) as
well as behavioral economists (See, e.g., Sunstein 2014) have established that people
routinely behave irrationally. Moreover, people are more reliant on others to develop
their capacities and exercise their autonomy than commonly acknowledged, according to
feminist philosophers (See, e.g., Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000). Disability, therefore,
according to Simplican reveals our collective vulnerability in a myriad of ways. As a
result, people experience profound anxiety around disabled people and the concept of
disability itself.
Our collective anxiety surrounding disability creates false narratives about the
“proper places” for disabled people and about children’s capacities and desires to live and
learn in integrated settings, especially when they are offered the proper support. When we
say that a child cannot learn in an integrated setting, for example, this is likely a
reflection of our own anxieties surrounding what it would mean for a disabled child to be
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in an integrated, classroom setting. Moreover, we are likely creating a self-fulfilling
prophesy—when we presume that someone cannot participate in society on the same
basis as others, we ensure that child will not do so (See, e.g., Swadley 2016; Pavey
2003).29
While our collective anxiety surrounding disability reflects the structures of
ableism to which we have become acclimated, it can also prompt us to reconsider the
proper venue for providing disability-specific services. As Simplican notes, the political
anxieties surrounding democratic participation for disabled people can prompt a
collective rethinking of not only disability, but also citizenship—“we can use anxiety as a
prompt, causing us to rethink our relationship to disability and democracy” (2015, 3).
Indeed, making disability public is one of the most powerful political tools we
have to dismantle ableism. Simplican suggests that “[b]eing disabled and public can
change what it means to be disabled and, at the same time, change the dynamics of the
public—as a physical and political space” (2015, 119). Because the activities of disabled
people are so frequently patrolled, controlled, regimented, and kept private, the mere act
of gathering in places where disabled people have previously been excluded can be
considered a radical political act—and one that challenges the presumptions of ableism.
As Simplican notes, “when people with intellectual disabilities and their allies gather in
public settings—from hotel lobbies to buffet restaurants—they contest the prejudicial
belief that disabled lives are miserable and best kept hidden” (Simplican 2015, 5). Being
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in public is a way that disabled people can reclaim their agency and challenge prevailing
stereotypes and social narratives about their agency, abilities, and vulnerabilities. The
mere act of making disability public by allowing and encouraging disabled people to take
up space previously denied to them is a powerful tool against ableism.
Suggestions that disabled people can be better served in segregated settings ignore
how ableism operates. The idea that disabled people cannot be served in public settings
more frequently operates to reinforce collective anxieties about how difficult or costly it
would be to destabilize ableist structures than it does to benefit disabled people.
Therefore, this project will demonstrate that making disability public—and in the process
making the public reckon with its collective discomfort surrounding disability—is a vital
part of ensuring that disabled citizens are able to participate on an equal basis with their
political peers. This project aims to demonstrate that disabled people can and do flourish
in integrated educational, employment, and community settings—when they are provided
with the appropriate support to do so.
6.2 Disability Segregation Maintains Substantive Inequalities
Colker (2008) maintains that in many circumstances, offering disability-specific
services in segregated settings improves substantive outcomes, thereby advancing
equality. However governmental policies favoring segregation frequently undermine
disability justice. Segregation is both ideologically and materially related to worse
outcomes for disabled people.
This project starts with Fraser’s assumption that “justice requires social
arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to interact with one another as
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peers” (30). This project is also premised upon a support-based theory of personhood—
the ideas that disabled people can and should make their own decisions based upon their
own preferences, provided that appropriate support is given, and that disabled people
should have full access to an array of social resources necessary to enact their expressed
preferences. This is the conception of personhood advanced by the UNCRPD and is
widely accepted within the disability community. 30 It is my contention that governmental
policies favoring integration are necessary to redress the inequalities faced by disabled
citizens and to afford them meaningful choices about how to conduct their lives, whether
integrated into their communities or separate.
My argument is that a non-ideal theory of disability justice requires consideration
of integration as a metric for determining participatory parity. My theoretical assumptions
are: (1) based upon a non-ideal understanding of the world, and (2) modelled upon
Elizabeth Anderson’s arguments regarding racial integration. Elizabeth Anderson (2010)
discusses racial inequities, demonstrating that segregation exacerbates racial inequities
for several reasons. Anderson argues that segregation yields group inequality when “the
group practicing social closure controls the allocation of goods critical to securing power
or advantage” (2010, 10). Anderson argues that racial segregation causes: (1)
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socioeconomic disadvantage, (2) racial stigma, which exacerbates existing disadvantages,
and (3) causes democratic processes to be less accountable to the disadvantaged group.
She concludes that in order to serve all citizens equally and to create systems that allow
for equal participation, integration is a requirement for a just society.
The pervasive inequities caused by segregation lead Anderson to conclude: “If
segregation is a fundamental cause of social inequality and undemocratic practices, then
integration promotes greater equality and democracy. Hence, it is an imperative of
justice” (2010, 2). This section will apply Anderson’s arguments in the context of
disability segregation, arguing that many of Anderson’s arguments against racial
segregation apply to the segregation of disabled people as well.
These arguments closely parallel phenomena in the disability community. For
instance, disabled people experience poverty at twice the rate of nondisabled people
(NCD 2017). As I will argue, a significant part of the reason disabled people live in
poverty is that they are denied access to competitive, integrated employment—a key
element of allowing people to escape poverty and live independent lives. The segregation
of disabled people explicitly perpetuates the apparatus of ableism by maintaining separate
spheres for disabled people—denying them access to their non-disabled peers because a
world that permits their integration does not exist. Integration, as I will argue, is a
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prerequisite for genuine choice regarding whether a disabled person will live in an
integrated or segregated setting.
6.2.a Sheltered Workshops
Disabled people are routinely segregated in the sphere of employment, which
atrophies their abilities, denies them access to integrated spaces, and traps them in an
endless cycle of poverty. The economic segregation of disabled people directly
contributes to socioeconomic disadvantage in several ways. For example, the segregation
of disabled people often takes the form of work in “sheltered workshops” or 14(c)
programs that explicitly allow employers to pay subminimum wage to disabled persons.
According to the National Council on Disability (NCD), approximately 228,600 disabled
people are in the 14(c) (subminimum wage) program (NCD 2017).31 Sheltered workshops
are explicitly segregated settings in which disabled people generally perform menial
labor with other disabled people, rather than participating in competitive, integrated
employment. Most people are either forced into working in “sheltered workshops” or
presumptively work in these spaces because they are not considered “capable” of
working in competitive, integrated settings.
Although the alleged purpose of sheltered workshops is to give disabled people
skills that they can use in competitive, integrated employment, only 5 per cent of
sheltered workshop employees ever leave them to take a job in the community (NCD
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2012, 10). The choice about whether to enter a sheltered workshop is rarely the choice of
a disabled person—it is typically a choice made by the disabled person’s family, often
without the consent of the disabled person.32
It is not clear that these workers cannot or do not desire to flourish in competitive,
integrated employment environments. According to studies, disabled people who had
previously been served by sheltered workshops do not have higher rates of employment
compared to people who receive other community-based services, such as supported
employment (See, e.g., Cimera 2011). Moreover, people who had previously been in
sheltered workshops reported lower socioeconomic outcomes compared to disabled peers
who received supported employment (NCD 2017).
Studies have found that by matching and controlling for diagnosis, the presence of
secondary conditions, and gender, supported employees from non-sheltered workshops
were just as likely to be employed as people in sheltered workshops (See Cimera 2011).
Moreover, people participating in supported employment in a competitive setting earned
substantially more, as well as worked more hours. Even more surprisingly, the cost of
serving the comparable individuals in the community was lower than the support costs of
similarly situated individuals in sheltered workshops. This is likely because supported
employment provides disabled employees with long-term skills that they work to
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develop, whereas being in sheltered settings does not provide the same intensive training
and often atrophies peoples’ skills (See Cimera 2011, 24).
Sheltered workshop advocates suggest that these programs give people who
would not otherwise have jobs a sense of meaning. For example, the St. Lawrence New
York NYSARC33 coordinator argues, “For some people, because of their actual diagnosis
and disability, they need the support of the workshop… And they literally cannot perform
in a competitive setting.”34 However, Cimera (2011) suggests that this is more myth than
reality—workers with the exact same diagnosis and the presence of secondary conditions
performed better in competitive, integrated employment than they did in sheltered
settings.
The ability of disabled workers to perform in integrated settings is directly related
to participatory parity. Working in sheltered workshops, where workers are generally
paid subminimum wage, ensures a life of poverty for disabled workers—while earning a
wage can be a way toward economic self-sufficiency and away from poverty, earning
subminimum wage ensures dependency on caregivers. Moreover, the proliferation of
subminimum wage jobs is an explicit way in which people who have resources
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discriminate against disabled workers. By paying these workers a subminimum wage,
employers are making it clear that disabled work is less valuable than nondisabled work.
While it might be argued that these workers could be simply paid minimum wage,
that would not solve the root cause of the inequity that results from sheltered workshops.
Sheltered workshops deter disabled people from pursuing work in their communities and
frequently lead to the atrophy of disabled people’s skills. The state-sanctioned segregated
environments deny disabled people access to their nondisabled peers. Sheltered
workshops are a way to keep disabled people out of the public sphere. Moreover, the
economic model of sheltered settings relies on the devaluation of disabled work to
continue “serving” disabled people. By allowing subminimum wage work, the
government has made an implicit value judgment that disabled work is less valuable. The
way that sheltered workshops pay for the “support” they provide is by exploiting the
excess profit generated by disabled people’s labor.
Disabled people working in sheltered settings need higher levels of support and
supervision than disabled people who have been taught workplace skills. Sheltered
workshops exploit this fact to pay workers less than they deserve. Therefore, as Anderson
would argue, sheltered workshops concentrate wealth and resources in the hands of nondisabled people, leaving many disabled people without a “way out” of poverty.
Subminimum wage jobs dissuade, discourage, and deter would-be workers from seeking
competitive, integrated employment and send the message that disabled work is less
valuable. As such, the existence of the subminimum wage is inimical to the idea of
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participatory parity and one example of how segregated settings perpetuate injustices
against disabled people.
6.2.b Social Security Disability Benefits and Socioeconomic Exclusion
The second way in which disabled people are deterred from participating in
competitive, integrated employment in the United States is the structure of disability
benefits. Disabled people who demonstrate that they cannot participate in “substantial
gainful activity” (SGA) are frequently eligible for Social Security Disability Insurance
(SSDI) or Supplemental Security Income (SSI), or both.35 However, these programs
frequently create what Stapleton et al. (2006) call a “poverty trap.” There are two major
problems with these programs: (1) they do not provide enough money on which to live,
and (2) they make it impossible for disabled people to participate in substantial gainful
activity.
To participate in either of these programs, recipients must continually
demonstrate that they cannot participate in substantial gainful activity, which means that
they must not earn over a certain income threshold (generally around $1000 per month).
The sudden loss of benefits experienced by beneficiaries when they reach substantial
gainful activity for a set number of months is frequently called the “cash cliff” in the
literature. Most beneficiaries of these programs therefore do not work, in order to avoid
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jeopardizing their benefits—even though the maximum SSI benefit is only 75 per cent of
the federal poverty standard for one person (Stapleton et al. 2006). There is evidence that
a significant proportion of SSDI beneficiaries would choose to work part-time but do not
because of the cash cliff. A study by Westat suggests that if substantial gainful activity
limits were removed, competitive employment rates would increase by 16 per cent, and
the average annual income of working beneficiaries would increase between $15,600 and
$22,500 (May et al. 2019).
There are therefore several ways in which this program maintains the social
exclusion and segregation of disabled people. First, the system is unduly punitive.
Disabled people are deterred from participating in any type of work for fear that they
might lose vital benefits that allow them to survive. Second, many recipients fear that
engaging in any type of SGA jeopardize their benefits, as the Social Security
Administration (SSA) may deem them fit to work. Finally, people on SSI are frequently
unable to marry their partner, because they might otherwise lose their benefits. 36
Social Security disability programs are one of the starkest examples of people
who control social resources using the role separation of disabled people to not only
control their behavior, but also to compound their poverty and dependence. When people
are deterred from participating in integrated programs to receive disability-specific
benefits, they are doomed to a life of poverty and inequity—as well as a life of social
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isolation and exclusion. A substantial body of research suggests that encouraging
disabled people to seek competitive, integrated employment would substantially improve
substantive economic outcomes for disabled persons, thereby allowing them to escape
poverty. As will be discussed further in Chapter 4, most, if not all, disabled people can
work in an integrated setting, if they are given the proper community supports. The
government should be supporting options for disabled workers to pursue competitive,
integrated employment, rather than deterring it through the ways in which benefit
programs are structured.
6.2.c Segregated Education and the School to Poverty Pipeline
Youth with disabilities constitute 12 percent of all youth in the United States
(Lipscomb et al. 2017, i). Data from the National Longitudinal Transition Study 2012
suggests that despite the IDEA, students with Individualized Education Programs (IEPs)
lag behind their peers in important ways—in large part, due to segregation and lack of
resources dedicated toward helping them succeed. Youth with IEPs generally feel
positively toward school. However, they frequently need heightened support to complete
tasks independently. The problem is that they frequently do not receive such support. For
example, children with IEPs are more likely to struggle academically; yet they are less
likely to receive school-based help in the form of before and after-school programs.
Moreover, teachers, parents, and administrators expect less of these children than their
peers—disabled people frequently do not receive career planning services, in part,
because their teachers, counselors, and parents do not think that they will be able to live
independently as adults. Lipscomb et al. (2017) found that only 78 per cent of parents of
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students with IEPs think that their children will be able to live independently as adults,
compared to 96 per cent of parents of children with no IEP.
Moreover, many more students with disabilities experience social isolation in
their schools. Only two-thirds of students with an IEP are part of an extra-curricular
activity, compared to more than three-quarters of their peers without an IEP. Moreover,
only 50 per cent of youth with an IEP take part in activities organized outside of school,
such as hanging out with friends, weekly. Two-thirds of children without IEPs report
doing so (Lipscomb et al. 2017).
Chapter 3 will discuss education, including the problems inherent to segregated
settings, in more detail; however, the above data allow us to draw several preliminary
conclusions. First, many students with IEPs receive some or all of their education in
segregated settings, and this appears to be correlated with lower levels of social inclusion.
Moreover, key stakeholders view children with disabilities as less likely to lead
independent lives, creating self-fulfilling prophesies wherein these students do not end up
living or working independently. These are examples of stereotyping and role
segregation, to use Anderson’s framework.
Returning to Anderson’s framework, both stereotyping and role segregation mean
disabled students are less likely to achieve positive socioeconomic outcomes. By having
their capacities stereotyped, disabled students are less likely to achieve. This sets disabled
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students up for a lifetime of role segregation—often through the form of subminimum
wage employment, discussed above.
7. Supported Integration vs. Naïve Integrationism
The above sections provide a prima facie argument for an integration
presumption. While integration may not be sufficient to create disability justice, it is not
irrelevant to disability justice either. When governmental policies prioritize segregated
spaces over integrated ones with proper support, disabled people are denied a meaningful
choice about what type of environment is better for them—integrated environments
simply are not built for them. This means, as Anderson argues, that integration, as a
matter of policy preference, is an imperative of justice.37
How then do we account for arguments like Colker’s and other interlocutors? It
seems clear that many integrated environments fail to provide disabled people with
substantive equality. My answer to this is two-fold: (1) meaningful chances for
integration are necessary but not sufficient to create disability justice, and (2) the
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Governmental policy is inherently going to favor one or the other due to resource
constraints—and disabled people are empowered to make meaningful choices about how
to live their lives when they are provided with community-based options. For example,
my argument does not preclude disabled people banding together to form collectives or
peer-support networks—but would require that people not be forcibly hospitalized.
Likewise, Culturally Deaf people could live in segregated communities but would not be
forced to by the structures of their government benefits programs.
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instances of integration decried by many scholars and caretakers are not truly integration
at all—rather, they are examples of what I will call naïve integration.
Naivety implies a lack of sophistication or complexity in structure, and that is
exactly how integration has been carried out for disabled people. For example,
deinstitutionalization has had profound benefits for many disabled people;38 however, it
has also left swathes of disabled people behind (See Bagenstos 2012). Indeed, Olmstead
has been described as a “psychiatric Titanic” by a leading psychiatrist—a sentiment with
which two ideologically disparate Supreme Court justices (Kennedy and Breyer) agreed
(Bagenstos 2012, 1). It is now taken for granted in many academic circles that mass
deinstitutionalization caused a host of social ills for many disabled people, including
homelessness and criminalization. Again, as Bagenstos (2012) notes and Chapter 2 will
argue, the reality is far more complicated, and the Pennhurst Longitudinal Study suggests
that carefully considered integration remedies many of the ills of naïve integration.
Nonetheless, there is a real sense in which deinstitutionalization has failed many disabled
people, because it was not accompanied by a more radical change to support structures
and benefits systems within the communities into which disabled people were integrated.
Likewise, the IDEA guarantees students a free and appropriate public education
in the least restrictive environment, which is defined by law as the environment where
students spend the most time with their nondisabled peers. Chapter 3 will discuss the
examples of Amy Rowley and Neill Roncker, two students who were arguably not served
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by the courts’ emphasis on such naïve integration. However, as I will demonstrate, the
problems faced by Rowley and Roncker were not the result of their receiving an
education in an integrated setting. Instead, these problems were the result of courts again
failing to provide them with adequate rights and services within integrated settings. The
story is the same for employment, where workers for years faced the dilemma of being
too disabled to be considered “qualified” while not disabled enough to merit protections
under the ADA—and now are disadvantaged by their perceived lack of qualification.
The fundamental premise of this project is simple—when adequate supportive
measures are provided, no disabled person should be presumptively segregated.39 Not
only does proper integration redress the forcible seclusion suffered by disabled people for
years, it also yields better outcomes. This will be demonstrated by looking at
deinstitutionalization, education, and employment. The goal of this project is to prompt
one to think: is segregation the only way to provide disability-specific services? Or the
best? Or are we under the influence of ableism when we make these claims? When
disabled people prefer segregated settings, is that because they truly prefer segregated
settings, or is it because they are persistently ostracized and denied services in integrated
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Environments that are voluntarily separate are different than segregated settings in that
they are purposefully designed and willingly chosen. I do not take as much issue with
these environments. However, we must view these environments in the context of the
apparatus of ableism. It is possible that many disabled people might prefer separate
environments because of the levels of discrimination and lack of access they face in
current built environments. As I have noted, Culturally Deaf persons are largely exempt
from the arguments I make, except insofar as they have been victims of forcible
segregation.
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settings? Asking such questions reveals the contingency of present arrangements and the
ableism underpinning claims that disabled people are “better off” when they are placed in
segregated settings.
Naïve integrationism is not inevitable, however. Already, disabled people and
their legal advocates are building powerful claims based on the integration mandate of
Title II of the ADA. For example, advocates in Oregon have successfully instated
supported employment as opposed to sheltered workshops, and litigators have used the
Olmstead mandate to progress toward the closure of entirely segregated school systems.
Olmstead might not have realized its potential, but it is nonetheless a powerful tool in the
arsenal of disability rights litigators and activists.
The supported integration envisaged by this project requires us to imagine a future
in which naïve integration is not inevitable—but rather, people are provided the supports
they need to flourish in their communities. These supports range from supported
employment and educational services to supported housing options for people during
mental health crises. The chapters that follow try to paint a different picture of disability
integration—a picture in which people can receive the services and supports that are
typically provided in segregated settings currently in integrated settings, a picture in
which disabled people can make meaningful choices about their care. The acts of
imagination called for by this project ought not but might seem radical; however, if one
thinks about the ways in which the world is built to the exclusion of disabled body-minds,
one can see the potential for an alternative future in which structures are not built to the
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exclusion of disabled people but rather a fully supported and accessible inclusivity. This
type of “radical” inclusivity is the goal at which this project aims.
8. Roadmap for the Rest of the Project
As mentioned previously, this project covers deinstitutionalization, education, and
employment in turn. Chapter 2 focuses on the shift from institutionalization to
community-based services. It argues that there is truth in the claim that
deinstitutionalization has brought attention to the problems of homelessness in the
disability community. There is also truth in the claim that carceral settings have far too
frequently replaced institutional settings. Nonetheless, the problem is not that disabled
people are being integrated into the community when they somehow ought not be. The
true problem lies in the way that public officials carried out integration. The problem lies
in cuts to vital social services and the failure to build proper infrastructure to support
people in the community as Olmstead requires.
Chapter 3 focuses on education. Education is one of the primary venues in which
scholars argue that disabled children benefit from segregated settings. This chapter
challenges that presumption. Disabled students generally achieve better educational
outcomes in integrated settings, provided they are given the support they need to flourish.
Integrated schools do not guarantee equality; however, segregating students maintains the
ableist premise that differential services can only be provided in segregated settings. The
amount of funding spent on segregated settings, this chapter argues, would be better spent
giving children individualized experiences in the most integrated setting possible. The
problems plaguing the American education system currently do not stem from integrating
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disabled students—rather, they are the result of naïve integrationism. Even Neill
Roncker, many scholars’ primary example of a student who cannot benefit from
integration, could have received (and benefitted from) services in an integrated school if
funding structures were simply set up to allow that—and he would have had access to his
nondisabled peers.
Chapter 4 explores naïve integrationism in an employment context. This is
perhaps where naïve integrationism is its starkest. The ADA as drafted in 1990 provided
anti-discrimination protections to disabled workers, but only if they were disabled enough
to be eligible for protections while simultaneously qualified enough to perform the
essential functions of their job. This led to disproportionate numbers of plaintiffs losing
their employment discrimination cases on the basis that they were not disabled enough to
be eligible for protection under the ADA. Since the adoption of the ADA Amendments
Act of 2008 (ADAAA), litigants are proving that they are disabled; however, they are
frequently losing cases on the basis that they are viewed to be unqualified for their jobs.
Disabled workers therefore are protected, but only if they are not so disabled that their
employer can claim that they are not qualified. Moreover, thousands of disabled people
still work in completely segregated settings. This chapter describes the ways in which
Olmstead litigation can remedy the latter problem. However, the employment dilemma is
one that cannot fully be solved by suing under the integration mandate. It will require
more creative and sustained advocacy by the disability community. Chapter 4 concludes
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by discussing the ways the policy and legal community can work together to create
meaningful employment opportunities for disabled people.
The Conclusion of the project synthesizes these case studies to argue that
segregation is not the answer to the inequalities faced by disabled people. Integration may
not be sufficient to create disability justice; however, it is not irrelevant to disability
justice either. Disabled people can and do thrive in integrated settings if the proper
supports are available. Current law, in most places, provides a means of litigating for
more expansive supports, and creative disability activists and litigators are utilizing the
Olmstead mandate in innovative ways to bring about better outcomes in integrated
settings. It is therefore possible to lament the current inequalities faced by disabled
people while simultaneously working toward a more just, more integrated society. The
Conclusion provides a picture of what integration can look like across the life of a
disabled person, as well as addressing the unique challenges and opportunities presented
by the COVID-19 global pandemic for disabled people.
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Chapter 2: From Institutionalization and Incarceration to Olmstead
“Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all
resemble prisons?”
-Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish
“I feel all institutions should be closed for good. I wish that families and government
officials could be in an institution to see how it is for themselves. I lived in three of them
and I can tell you how it was.”
-Carole Talley
“Close the doors, close the doors,
close the doors
Behind us forever
… Cuz we deserve better
-Self-Advocates Becoming Empowered Song
“Could it be that the very idea of Pennhurst (and similar places) contained within itself
the seeds of its own ruin?”
Downey & Conroy, Pennhurst and the Struggle for Disability Rights
1. Introduction
Dorothea Dix, a social reformer in the 1840s, spearheaded the movement toward
the “therapeutic” institutionalization of disabled people. Dix conducted a tour of
Massachusetts to document the lives of disabled people. She lamented that families
commonly abandoned disabled people. They were wards of the state. They were kept in
prisons and almshouses. They were locked in basements and kept in holding pens. Her
desire to create institutions and state-run schools was in response to “the strong claims of
suffering humanity” she had witnessed (Dix, qtd. in Am. J. Public Health 2006).
Therefore, the first state-run residential “schools” for disabled people were intended to be
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therapeutic. They were “meant to offer some modicum of physical comfort and safety,
perhaps even the possibility of an education or treatment” (Pelka 2012, 48).
However “noble” (or paternalistic) the motives of reformers such as Dix were,
institutions quickly became entangled with the eugenics movement (See Pelka 2012;
Chapman et al. 2014). As Chapman et al. (2014) argue, segregating disabled people soon
became an end in itself. Institutions betrayed their rehabilitative aims and became sites of
abuse and exclusion. Downey and Conroy suggest: “Once thought to be progressive
training facilities, institutions like Pennhurst became a nightmare, or a kind of ‘purgatory’
for the oppressed, the epitome of what was wrong in failed public policy in the treatment
of individuals with mental disabilities” (2020, 5). It is no wonder, therefore, that
institutions were one of the primary targets of early disability advocacy. The parents’
movement of the 1950s and 1960s and the independent living and psychiatric survivor
movements that emerged during the 1970s were both deeply informed by the experiences
of people in confinement (See e.g. Fleischer and Zames 2013; Pelka 2012; Carey 2009;
Downey and Conroy 2020).
This Chapter does not seek to document the abuses of institutions extensively.
Disability scholars and activists have well documented such histories (See, e.g., Pelka
2013; Shapiro 2011; Nielsen 2012; Trent 2017; O’Brien 2013; Downey and Conroy
2020). Even those most sympathetic to the idea of forcibly segregating disabled people
generally agree that horrific abuses were perpetrated in institutions and state schools at
the hands of the state. Yet, the institutionalization of disabled people is still advocated

47
because the movement toward deinstitutionalization is perceived as a failure.40 The point
of this Chapter is to dispel the myth that deinstitutionalization has “failed” and moreover
that insofar as it was a failure, it failed because disabled people cannot live independent,
fulfilling lives in their communities. Instead, as with education and employment, true
integration cannot happen unless the state makes available the resources communities
need to put the proper supports in place. It is true that too many disabled people are
homeless and incarcerated—but this is not because of deinstitutionalization, but rather
mainly due to rampant cuts and underfunding of public services needed to serve disabled
people in their communities (See, e.g., Ben-Moshe 2020; Bagenstos 2012).
This Chapter begins by discussing the wave of deinstitutionalization litigation
starting in the 1970s and 1980s, to the Olmstead decision in 1999, culminating with
subsequent Olmstead litigation. I then progress to discuss criticisms of
deinstitutionalization, following this discussion by discussing programs and services that
empirically enable effective community integration. I conclude that, naïve integrationism
was responsible for the perceptual failures of deinstitutionalization—disabled people can
and do live fulfilling lives in their communities when they are provided with the
resources necessary to do so. In order to preserve a robust range of choices for disabled
people and to ensure participatory parity, disabled people must be afforded a full range of
supportive options in their communities. This project maintains that no disabled person
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should be presumptively institutionalized, placed in long-term care facilities, or
incarcerated.
2. Deinstitutionalization Litigation
The formalized movement for deinstitutionalization started during and drew
traction from the independent living movement (See Fleischer and Zames 2011). In the
1960s, independent living centers for physically disabled people started to develop in
places such as UC Berkeley and in New York City. The Berkeley Center for Independent
living became a kind of “mecca for the handicapped [sic]” (The New York Times qtd. In
Fleischer and Zames 2011, 39), a model for self-determination and independence for the
disability community. Shortly, “Centers for Independent Living” emerged across the
country. Contemporaneously to and influenced by this movement, psychiatric survivors
and mental health consumers, as well as self-advocates in the intellectual and
developmental disability (ID/D) community began to advocate for independent,
community-based living (See Friedman 2014). These movements set the stage for broader
litigation efforts aimed at ending the practice of institutionalization and ensuring that
disabled people were able to live independent, self-determined lives in their communities.
In what follows, this Chapter discusses these litigation efforts and their consequences.
2.1 Pennhurst and early deinstitutionalization litigation
One of the earliest and most notable class actions challenging the practice of
institutionalization was brought against Pennhurst State School & Hospital in
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Pennsylvania.41 Four plaintiffs along with the Department of Justice and PARC42 sued
under state and federal statutes, as well as on constitutional grounds.
Judge Broderick criticized Pennhurst in a scathing opinion on several bases. First,
he noted that, at its best, Pennhurst, as a large, poorly staffed institution, was impersonal
and restrictive.43 Residents had little to no control over their routines or treatment.
Moreover, instead of enabling residents with skills they needed to live independent lives,
residents’ social and intellectual capacities tended to diminish over time spent in the
institution.44 The conditions faced by residents were abysmal, and the institution did not
provide proper medical, occupational therapy, or psychological services for residents. 45
Occupants were routinely refused rehabilitative devices, such as adaptations to their
wheelchairs or hearing aids due to poor resources.46 Only 22 out of 300 nonverbal
patients received communication classes. 47 Patients were frequently restrained, secluded,
or forcibly given psychotropic medication as a means of controlling their behavior. 48 The
patients also frequently exhibited signs and symptoms of abuse.49 The mother of one
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See Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
Then known as the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children. The organization
is now known as The Arc of Pennsylvania.
43 Pennhurst, 446 F. Supp 1302-3.
44 Id. at 1302.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 1304-5.
47 Id.
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Id. at 1306-8.
49 Id. at 1309-10.
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plaintiff who witnessed the conditions at Pennhurst remarked that she “would not leave a
dog in conditions like that.”50
Although the stated purpose of Pennhurst was to reintegrate disabled people into
their communities by teaching them useful life skills, Pennhurst was not designed or
equipped to habilitate people. Its sole function was to keep intellectually disabled people
in a permanent holding pattern, often by restricting them from any outside contact. 51 This
was true of many institutions—the parents of institutionalized persons were frequently
discouraged from visiting their institutionalized children, as Carey (2009) notes. Most
people at Pennhurst and similar institutions were admitted at the prerogative of their
parents. Although the law required that these children be informed of their right to leave
at the age of 18, this was an illusory liberty. In practice, staff frequently petitioned courts
to have people who expressed interest in leaving legally committed. 52 Therefore, Judge
Broderick concluded that people were not in reality free to leave Pennhurst at any point.
However, it is notable that Judge Broderick’s denunciation of institutions in
Pennhurst transcended the abysmal conditions faced by residents. His opinion probed the
core constitutional questions implicated by the forcible segregation of disabled people.
Judge Broderick concluded that there is a constitutional right to habilitation. 53 His
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53 Although, this language is a bit outdated, there are strong reasons to think that Judge
Broderick meant the types of supports envisaged by proponents of abolition (Ben-Moshe
2020). Judge Broderick held that people should be served in the most public setting
possible, and habilitation was a means of ensuring that people had those opportunities.
51
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holding was clear: “[w]e hold that when a state involuntarily commits retarded [sic]
persons, it must provide them with such habilitation as will afford them a reasonable
opportunity to acquire and maintain those life skills necessary to cope as effectively as
their capacities permit.”54 Although there is no federal constitutional guarantee to
habilitation, much like there is no federal constitutional right to education, 55 when a state
undertakes to provide habilitative services, “it must do so in the least restrictive setting
consistent with that individual’s habilitative needs.” 56
Most radically, Judge Broderick reasoned:
Institutions, by their very structure—a closed and segregated society founded on
obsolete custodial models—can rarely normalize and habilitate the mentally
retarded citizen to the extent of community programs created and modeled upon
the normalization and developmental approach components of habilitation. 57
It is for this reason that many credit Halderman v. Pennhurst with embedding in
constitutional jurisprudence an abolitionist framework of habilitation (See Ben-Moshe
2020). Although parts of the decision were overturned by the Supreme Court
subsequently on statutory grounds, as well as concern for state sovereign immunity,58
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Judge Broderick frequently noted, the constitutional right to habilitation was never
reversed by the Supreme Court (Ferleger 2012, 765). 59
However, since Pennhurst, no other federal court has held that the United States
Constitution guarantees this right to habilitation in the community. Indeed, constitutional
claims in disability cases have become functionally obsolete since the Supreme Court’s
decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center60 in 1985 and subsequent decision
in Board of Trustees v. Garrett61 in 2001 (See Waterstone 2014). Disability
discrimination receives only rational basis scrutiny under the U.S. Constitution. This
means that in order to pass constitutional muster, a state’s policy must only be rationally
related to a legitimate governmental interest, as opposed to intermediate scrutiny (sex) 62
and strict scrutiny (race) 63 that require a more searching inquiry. As many constitutional
law scholars have noted, rational bases accepted by courts frequently lack rationality and
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a basis.64 Indeed, the government rarely, if ever, loses on rational basis claims on the
appellate and Supreme Court level.65
However, some scholars, such as Ferleger (2012) have advocated for the
resuscitation of constitutional arguments against disability segregation. Ferleger argues
that segregation should be disallowed on both due process and equal protection grounds.
He argues that the class of unwillingly institutionalized people with intellectual
disabilities is a suspect or quasi-suspect class under the Constitution. Although the terms
“suspect” and “quasi-suspect” classifications (which correspond with heightened levels
of scrutiny) are generally reserved for race and gender respectively, 66 the Supreme Court
has (infrequently) held that other classes may constitute “quasi-suspect” classes that
demand more searching judicial scrutiny. For example, in Plyler v. Doe,67 the Supreme
Court held that immigrant children being fully denied their right to education by being
charged tuition constituted a quasi-suspect class.68 Ferleger suggests that when one
narrows the class of disabled people to those who have had their freedoms maximally
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Dr. Craig Green, my Constitutional law professor, would probably appreciate that this
quote made it into my dissertation.
65 For instance, the government can freely discriminate against people selling filled milk
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Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The government can also enact immigration
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Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392 (2018). The only reason the government lost in Cleburne was
that its reasons were facially discriminatory.
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67 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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Though the Court denied that immigrants generally were a suspect class and that
education is a fundamental right.
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violated, the class falls under what Carolene Products69 termed a discrete and insular
minority that have been historically oppressed and therefore qualify for strict scrutiny.
Ferleger moreover argues that the unwilling institutionalization of intellectually
disabled people is irrational and therefore fails under traditional Equal Protection Clause
analysis. He suggests that for each person who is institutionalized, there is a “twin” who
is living successfully within the community who shares their functional impairments and
limitations. This, according to Ferleger, suggests that institutions are both separate and
unequal, because they lack the habilitation benefits of community-based services.
Although I am inclined to agree with Ferleger’s claims in principle, his logic is
undercut by the current politics of the federal courts, as well as the practicalities of
litigating civil rights suits in a post-Trump world. Equal Protection Clause arguments are
rarely used by disability rights organizations and typically are put into briefs only if
directly requested by clients or co-counsel. Qualitative research of disability litigation
suggests that most impact litigation organizations feel similarly (Waterstone 2014). This
does not reflect a mere bias on the part of disability rights community but rather reflects
the fundamental willingness of courts to extend the Equal Protection Clause to cover
categories other than sex and race. Indeed, it was a struggle to extend the Equal
Protection Clause to sex and gender, and the only time in which the Supreme Court has
expanded the Clause’s protections to new groups in recent history was Plyler. Although
the constitutional claims do seem compelling and stronger, judicial politics and the
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passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act shortly after Cleburne was decided render
more modest Olmstead claims appealing to litigants. Given that President Trump has now
nominated nearly 200 (mostly white, mostly male, mostly abled) judges to the federal bar
at the time of writing, as well as cemented a 6-3 Conservative majority in the Supreme
Court, it is unlikely that Equal Protection Clause litigation will be a fruitful avenue going
forward. Olmstead, as I will argue in the next section, provides more modest protections
against institutionalization; however, it has more potential in a post-Trump era to serve as
a legal tool for pursuing community integration in a variety of contexts.
2.2 Olmstead and service provision in the “most integrated setting”
Lois Curtis had spent half of her life being funneled from one institution to
another when she teamed up with lawyer, Sue Jamieson, at Atlanta Legal Services, to
challenge her detention. Jamieson recalls Curtis periodically calling her throughout the
litigation, always asking the same question: “When can I get out of here?” (Ben-Moshe
2020, 252-53). Curtis’ case would go before the Supreme Court in what has been termed
the Brown v. Board of Education for the disability community.70 Curtis and co-plaintiff
Wilson had been voluntarily committed to a psychiatric unit for treatment—both women
were intellectually disabled, diagnosed with psychiatric disabilities. 71 Both women’s
doctors agreed that their needs could be appropriately met by state-funded, community-
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based programs, and both women wanted to leave; however, they remained
institutionalized for several years.72 The Supreme Court considered whether this
continued institutionalization despite the availability of community resources was
justifiable under Title II (public services) of the Americans with Disabilities Act—the
Court qualified its answer but held that the ADA generally prohibited needless
segregation.73
Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower courts addressed the question of whether
the plaintiffs’ detention and lack of treatment was constitutional—they resolved the
question “solely on statutory grounds.”74 Title II of the ADA reads:
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a
disability, shall be excluded from participation or denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.
The Court looked to the regulations promulgated with Title II to resolve the statutory
question. Those regulations require that public entities administer programs in the “most
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.” 75
This, according to the Court’s interpretation, as well as the preamble to the Attorney
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General’s regulations, requires public entities to serve individuals in settings where they
have the maximal ability to interact with non-disabled persons.76
Against the background of these settings, the District Court in Olmstead held that
when “a disabled individual’s treating professionals find that a community-based
placement is appropriate for that individual, the ADA imposes a duty to provide
treatment in a community setting—the most integrated setting appropriate to that
patient’s needs.”77 The Supreme Court ultimately upheld this standard when determining
whether service in community settings is required by the ADA. The Court reasoned that
unjustified isolation is discrimination based on disability, while acknowledging that states
may in some circumstances need to segregate individuals to provide habilitative services
and treatment.
The Court was quick to caveat that nothing in the ADA required
deinstitutionalizing persons “unable to handle or benefit from community settings,”
because the ADA only applies to “qualified individuals with a disability.” 78 Moreover,
states and their medical professionals have broad discretion in determining whether an
individual “qualifies” for community services. States’ responsibilities are also limited to
making “reasonable” modifications to community programs and are not required to make
“fundamental alterations” to their services or programs.79 Finally, litigants must take into
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consideration a state’s resources and ability to provide community services. Therefore,
the statutory in Olmstead is far more tentative and has less jurisprudential force than the
standard in Pennhurst. Indeed, scholars such as Ben-Moshe (2020) have criticized
Olmstead for not going far enough—while Pennhurst represented abolitionist principles,
Olmstead protections extend only to individuals courts deem to be “qualified.”
As will be argued throughout this project, the Olmstead mandate—that people
receive services in the most integrated setting appropriate—has been effectively
leveraged by disability rights organizations in a variety of contexts. Olmstead litigation is
the strongest form of protection currently available to disabled plaintiffs. At the same
time, statutory protections are generally regarded as weaker than constitutional
protections, and Olmstead’s integration mandate is no exception. Had the Court found
that there is a constitutional right to habilitation in the community, states would not have
the excuse that treating people in the community is too expensive or constitutes a
“fundamental alteration” to their programs and services. State entities would be
constitutionally required to make fundamental alterations to ensure that disabled people
received the support and services they need in the community. Olmstead indeed
constituted a substantial victory for the disability community; however, like subsequent
litigation in its racial analogue, Brown v. Board of Education, in many cases, its ability to
influence radical desegregation efforts has been truncated by the federal courts.
The legacy of Olmstead has therefore been mixed. As some scholars have noted,
the rate of deinstitutionalization between June 30, 1990 and June 30, 1999 was greater
than the deinstitutionalization rate post-Olmstead (See Lakin et al. 2009). However,
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Olmstead has made significant changes to the legal landscape surrounding
deinstitutionalization. In part, the decrease in deinstitutionalization post-Olmstead can be
attributed to the fact that few people were left in formal institutions by the time Olmstead
was decided. The real significance of Olmstead, I argue, is its change to the general
landscape of disability rights. Olmstead bluntly declares that segregated sections are
discriminatory—this has led to a fundamental shift, as I will argue, in the possibilities
available to disabled plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have used Olmstead in education and
employment, for example, to challenge the needless placement of disabled people in
segregated settings. Moreover, the same structural arguments that led the Supreme Court
to hold that needless segregation is discriminatory have percolated the disability policy
space as well—for instance, Olmstead gives advocates a language in which to challenge
needless incarceration. 80 Therefore, despite its shortcomings, this project argues that the

See e.g. Ira A. Burnim, “Using the Americans with Disabilities Act to Reduce the
Incarceration of People with Mental Illness,” MACARTHUR FOUNDATION (Jan. 12, 2017),
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with disabilities.
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framework set forth by Olmstead provides a vital tool for disability organizations and
advocates seeking to overcome disability segregation.
3. Criticisms of Olmstead and Deinstitutionalization
The idea that deinstitutionalization failed is frequently taken as axiomatic (See
Bagenstos 2012). The founder of the controversial Treatment Advocacy Center 81
described it as a “psychiatric Titanic,” (Torrey 1998, 11), a phrase quoted by two
Supreme Court justices in an Olmstead concurrence.82 Torrey (1998) blames
deinstitutionalization for the onslaught of psychiatrically disabled people living on streets
and in jails and prisons. He also blames lack of treatment for increased violence
perpetrated by psychiatrically disabled people. Torrey acknowledges that “[s]ome of [his]
recommendations may not be politically correct, but [he believes] they are factually
correct” (vii). Throughout his book, he suggests that psychiatrically disabled people have
“nowhere to go” but the streets or jails and prisons. He calls mentally ill persons
“walking time bombs” and begs America to transition “from legal folly to common
sense.” He blames civil rights lawyers “wag[ing] a highly publicized fight to limit the
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grounds for involuntary psychiatric hospitalization” for people’s difficulties in accessing
treatment.
More recently, an editorial in the Journal of the American Medical Association
penned by three bioethicists (Sisti, Segal and Emanuel 2015) called for a “return to the
asylum,” recounting the same narrative. The authors claim that jails and prisons are
becoming the “new asylums,” arguing that deinstitutionalization has increased the
number of people who are homeless and funneled into the criminal justice system. Sisti
then wrote a New York Times forum article in 2016, 83 arguing that psychiatric
institutions are a necessity. He argues:
To give these people the care they deserve, we need to bring back psychiatric
asylums. Not the dismal institutions that were shuttered in the past or settings of
gothic fiction, but asylums based on the true meaning of the word: places of
sanctuary and safety for vulnerable people. 84
This trend in scholarship represents what Ben-Moshe (2017; 2020) calls “the new
asylums thesis.” Ben-Moshe (2017; 2020) criticizes this “new asylums thesis,” and the
corresponding practice of calling prisons the “new asylums.” States undergoing
deinstitutionalization are blamed for “dumping people in the streets” and creating the
category of the “homeless mentally ill” (Ben-Moshe 2020, 136). She astutely notes that
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deinstitutionalization is not necessarily the cause of ongoing mass incarceration among
psychiatric disabled people. Why exactly is deinstitutionalization, which started rapidly
declining during the 1950s through 1980s still blamed for the conditions the disability
community faces today?
Ben-Moshe (2017; 2020) suggests that there is no “neat” connection between
deinstitutionalization, homelessness, and imprisonment. Instead of studying the root
causes of homelessness and focusing on ways to decrease housing insecurity and alleviate
poverty, sociological studies since deinstitutionalization have generally sought to
“quantify” homelessness. Ben-Moshe suggests that this history reaches back to the ways
in which funding has historically been allocated to housing programs—housing programs
have traditionally been the responsibility of local authorities and charities, whereas states
are responsible for generally administering health services. Therefore, there is a financial
incentive to identify homelessness as a mental health concern to shift the onus to states,
who have more resources than municipalities, to address the problems. Moreover, mental
health and housing instability are endogenous variables—“many of the behaviors and
responses exhibited by people who are homeless can be attributed to that fact alone, such
as being depressed, being agitated, mistrusting authority, having eating difficulties, and
being unresponsive” (Ben-Moshe 2020, 140). Finally, the most “visible” people who are
struggling with housing insecurity or who are unsheltered are frequently regarded as

63
mentally ill—the people who are not mentally ill yet housing insecure often “blend” with
others on the street or seek shelter from friends and relatives.
Fundamentally, “[o]ne needs to call into question the assumption that there is
anything normal about being housing insecure in an affluent society” (Ben-Moshe 2020,
140). Anyone facing housing instability faces what Jasbir Puar (2017) terms “debility.”
Debility refers to conditions, generally sanctioned by the state, that in themselves alter
our capacities in a way that presents as impairment. Whereas disability refers to
differences between people, debilitation is a form of government-sanctioned oppression.
Housing insecurity is fundamentally debilitating—housing insecurity itself causes people
to present with symptoms that we frequently associate with innate or acute mental illness.
This destabilizes the relationship between homelessness and mental illness.
Naïve integrationism offers an alternative explanation for why people who are
homeless could be the same population that was once housed in institutions. Current
trends in housing instability among psychiatrically disabled people and the I/DD
community were not caused by deinstitutionalization but rather naïve integrationism. As
both Ben-Moshe (2020) and Bagenstos (2012) astutely note, deinstitutionalization was
accompanied by cuts to social programs and austerity in the 1980s. The 1960s and 1970s
saw the expansion of programs such as Medicaid, SSI and SSDI, housing programs, and
food stamps, which provided vital resources deinstitutionalized people needed to
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successfully integrate into their communities (Bagenstos 2012; See also Mechanic and
Rochefort 1990). However, these programs experienced a retrenchment in the 1980s.
The United States increasingly perceived itself to be in a fiscal crisis that needed
to be remedied by reduced federal expenditures on “entitlement programs,” the use of
block grants and funding cuts debilitated key social programs, and old age began to be
viewed as an individual rather than collective problem. During this time, SSI and SSDI
were cut dramatically, as were most welfare programs, such as food stamps, that kept
disabled households afloat. A study conducted by Burkhauser et al. (1993) found that
disabled men never fully recovered from the recession and cuts to social welfare
programs in the early 1980s, according to data from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
data between 1968 and 1988. The familial wealth of many disabled men receded to or
below 1967 levels between 1981-1982. These effects were more pronounced for men
with disabilities who were non-white or “poorly educated.” It was not until the economy
recovered that disabled people recovered some of this wealth—but even then, people who
relied on SSI (a means-tested program) were at a disadvantage. The retrenchment in
social service provision meant that the disabled people who needed governmental
insurance programs most—including those who had been institutionalized—stopped
receiving benefits at sustainable levels.
Including the context of welfare cuts in the 1980s makes the social ills following
deinstitutionalization seem more like a story of naïve integrationism than a story of failed
attempts at deinstitutionalization. My argument is not that deinstitutionalization did not
bear any relation to the emerging problem of the “homeless mentally ill”—or the fact that

65
psychiatrically disabled people are imprisoned at far higher rates than their abled or
neurotypical counterparts. I agree, for example, that deinstitutionalization increased
disabled people’s encounters with the police—indeed, police officers often serve as a
person’s first point of contact with mental health services (Kane et al. 2017, 109). 85
Rather, my argument is that the picture is more complicated.
Supported integration is possible. People can and do live independently in their
communities when they are empowered to do so by the appropriate supports and services;
however, social service retrenchment in the 1980s made these resources less readily
available. Indeed, the Pennhurst Longitudinal Study conducted on former residents of
Pennhurst confirms this—the City of Philadelphia carefully managed the reintegration of
Pennhurst residents, and nearly all former Pennhurst patients were able to improve their
adaptive behaviors in community settings. In other terms, deinstitutionalization coupled
with placement in scattered-site community settings allowed people to regain some of the
skills that had atrophied during their time in institutions (Downey and Conroy 2000).
In what follows, this Chapter argues that evidence-based community-based
services can overcome naïve integration for disabled people by replacing it with
supported integration. However, local municipalities, states, and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) must start actively funding these programs for
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them to be effective. I conclude that the Olmstead mandate, while incomplete, provides a
useful framework for policymakers to embrace systemic change that will enable disabled
people to live independently in their communities.
4. Beyond Naïve Integration: The Future of Disability Desegregation
The provision of community services can act as a prophylactic measure to stop
the needless incarceration and institutionalization of disabled people. This Section
discusses a set of promising interventions that have been shown to allow people to live in
their communities—but that are presently underutilized because states and municipalities
are chronically under-resourced.
4.1 Assertive Community Treatment
An important way to prevent the over-policing and institutionalization of
psychiatrically disabled or I/DD people is to prevent contact with the police, criminal
justice system, or psychiatric institutions in the first place. This can be achieved through
direct service provision within the community. One particularly promising intervention is
Assertive Community Treatment (ACT). ACT involves the creation of a package of
individualized community services designed to meet the support and service needs of
people with severe mental health disabilities (See e.g. Bond and Drake 2015). An ACT
team is generally comprised of psychiatrists, nurses, employment specialists, housing
specialists, and a social worker. The goal is to help psychiatrically disabled people
navigate the demands and difficulties of independent living. The ACT team is on-call 247 to help address individual needs and diffuse any potential crises. Forensic ACT (FACT)
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is ACT that is specifically designed to help people who have had contact with the
criminal justice system and aims to reduce needless incarceration (Lamberti et al. 2004).
Lamberti (2004) found that participants were likely to spend far fewer days in jail
than those not receiving the same services. Non-participants spent an average of 43.5
days in jail, whereas study participants spent only 21.5 days in jail—a difference of
almost 50 percent. Smaller, more localized studies have repeatedly confirmed that
providing people the services they need in their communities can reduce needless
incarceration and hospitalization. An Illinois study found an 83 percent decrease in jail
days over the course of a year for participant in their ACT program, as well as an 85
percent decrease in the number of inpatient hospital days for study participants (The
Thresholds State, County Collaborative Jail Linkage Project, Chicago 2001). In
Oklahoma, participants who received ACT for the first time spent 65 percent fewer days
in jail and 71 percent fewer days in hospitals than people who did not receive ACT. 86
Although the success of ACT provides clear evidence that providing people with
the services they need in their communities works to reduce inpatient treatment and
incarceration, most municipalities are woefully unprepared to handle the support needs of
citizens. Currently, the ACT team in Philadelphia can only accommodate 350 people, for
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example.87 While this means that approximately 350 people have left long-term
residential care in Philadelphia in the past year, 88 the fact remains that mental health care
is too expensive for many people, and resources provided by large, poorer municipalities
like Philadelphia remain scarce. Many states, like Pennsylvania, have not increased
mental health funding in years. This compounds the problem, because in many states
(including Pennsylvania), mental health services are administered at either the county or
city-level. Therefore, it is up to struggling municipalities to increase the use and
implementation of programs such as FACT that have a proven track record of keeping
people off the streets and out of jails and inpatient units.
Litigation based on Olmstead can change how resources are allocated by local
municipalities; however, it cannot prompt fundamental alterations to the ways in which
municipalities provide services. Therefore, systemic policy changes and resource
allocation must occur at the state as well as the local level for these services to the reach
populations who need it most. Overcoming naïve integrationism is therefore not a simple
function of smart litigation. Nonetheless, smart litigation can help prompt localities to use
existing resources differently—to further the aims of integration. Impact litigation is
already changing the way services are providing to disabled people, as subsequent
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chapters will demonstrate. However, ending naïve integration will require a concerted
balance of litigation and systemic policy work.
4.2 Supported Housing and Independent Living
Supported housing provides a comprehensive set of services for the psychiatric
disability and I/DD communities, including subsidies for housing and social support to
allow people to be successful tenants. Supported housing allows people to live in their
own apartments and homes in the communities, and tenancy rights are frequently not
conditioned on participation in treatment programs. 89 Supported housing embraces three
core tenets: (1) people should receive immediate, permanent housing that is not
conditioned on people’s compliance with treatment regimens, (2) people in supported
housing receive assistance managing their conditions and securing and maintaining
employment, (3) residents are encouraged and assisted to integrate fully in their
community through employment, volunteer work, or social activities.90
People who live in supported housing settings have access to a comprehensive
package of services designed to allow them to live independent lives in the community—
such as, case management, treatment of psychiatric conditions or substance use, help
securing employment, home health aide services. Oftentimes, supported housing is
combined with ACT in order to help people maintain stability in their lives and housing
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situations. Generally, the disability advocacy community prefers scattered-site supported
housing (as opposed to disability-only housing), as this is the most integrated form of
supported housing available. 91
Many municipalities already operate housing programs that are provided to
disabled people. Olmstead therefore mandates that these services must be administered in
the most integrated settings appropriate and feasible. Supported housing programs are
frequently financed through Medicaid, as well as state and federal housing funds.
Medicaid funds cannot cover rental subsidies; however, individuals’ start-up costs may
be provided by Medicaid.92 Oftentimes, disabled people who qualify for supported
housing also qualify for federal rent subsidies like Section 8 housing. This helps offset
the cost of rent.
Supported housing is one type of program that has been expanded through
Olmstead settlement agreements entered by states with the U.S. Department of Justice.
For example, the settlement agreement in United States v. New York, O’Toole v. Cuomo
provided that adult home residents were eligible for supported housing unless they (a)
had significant dementia, (b) would be dangerous to themselves or others in supported
housing even if they received services, (c) need skilled nursing care that cannot be
provided in a community context, or (d) needed services not available through any
assistance programs.93 Likewise, a settlement in United States v. New Hampshire
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provided for the development of more than 600 scattered-site supported housing units. A
settlement in United States v. North Carolina required the development of 3000
scattered-site supported housing units. Many more such settlements have been negotiated.
These examples all suggest that litigation in the Olmstead context can and has created
substantial benefits for formerly institutionalized persons.
Supported housing is an effective way for states and municipalities to prevent the
needless incarceration or homelessness of disabled people. For example, pilot studies in
both Philadelphia and New York found that scattered-site supported housing dramatically
decreased incarceration rates for individuals involved in the studies (See e.g. Culhane et
al. 2002; Fairmount Ventures, Inc. 2011). An Ohio study found that individuals in
supported housing who had been incarcerated were 40 percent less likely to be re-arrested
and 61 percent less likely to be reincarcerated (Fontaine et al. 2012).
Moreover, supported housing is a cost-effective method of community treatment.
For example, multiple studies have demonstrated the comparative cost-effectiveness of
treating people in community settings vs. hospital or carceral settings (See Culhane et al.
2002; Dickey et al, 1997). The authors’ proffered reasons for the reduction in costs were
that: (1) these people were not homeless and therefore did not utilize shelter services, (2)
people were hospitalized less frequently and therefore did not need expensive, acute
services, and (3) people were incarcerated at a much lower frequency.
4.3 Acute Support Outside of Hospitals and Prisons
One might ask at this point: what about people who are experiencing acute mental
health crises? Are people experiencing mental health crises not prime examples of why
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we “need” inpatient care in the first place? My answer is that crisis services in the
community are both cost-effective and more effective at preventing suicide, self-harm, or
crime. Although interventions such as Crisis Intervention Teams that train officers to
respond appropriately to people experiencing mental health crises do not have an
established evidence base (Franz and Borum 2011), Mobile Crisis Teams, a related
concept, have proven effective at deescalating mental health crises without the use of
inpatient treatment.
Mobile Crisis Teams (MCTs) are teams of trained professionals whom police can
call to deescalate mental health crises. The goal of MCTs is to divert people from arrest
or inpatient care to services in their communities. They are typically comprised of at least
one peer specialist and an on-call psychiatrist.94 MCTs see individuals in place
immediately—meaning in their communities—to assess an individual’s immediate
support needs and should ideally be available 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. The
most successful MCTs have access to community crisis apartments with appropriate peer
support and on-call psychiatrists where people can stay as an alternative to being
hospitalized.95
MCTs are demonstrably more effective as a first-line response than police or
emergency department contact and can minimize the probability of people being arrested
or needing acute emergency care. Typical contacts between police officers and people
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experiencing mental health crises result in an average arrest rate of 21 percent. However,
when a MCT intervenes, the arrest rate is frequently below 7 percent (Lamb 2002, 1268).
Moreover, in Verde Valley, Arizona, a well-resourced MCT was able to stabilize crises in
the community for 55 percent of calls made by first responders (Frost 2016). Without the
MCT’s intervention, 90 of the 109 calls studied would have likely resulted in arrest or
hospitalization. Moreover, it is notable that both mental health consumers and police
officers prefer MCTs to police contact (Scott 2000).
The primary problem with MCTs is that they are frequently under-resourced.
Because they are funded by municipalities, which frequently rely on state funding, it is
unclear how many people are currently served by MCTs in large cities. For example,
Philadelphia operates such a service, but its capacity is unclear. This service furthermore
does not provide the apartments that would provide an adequate alternative to inpatient
hospitalization. However, the places in which MCTs have been resourced and studied
have shown the promise of these methods as opposed to inpatient treatment.
This project is agnostic to the question of whether people ever need inpatient
treatment and rather speaks only to the question of whether people should be
presumptively segregated. That is to say, I advocate an integration presumption.
However, there is a growing evidence base to indicate that inpatient treatment, especially
involuntary inpatient treatment, is neither therapeutic nor necessary in the vast majority
of cases. For example, Stefan (2015) finds that people frequently experience more trauma
than support in inpatient settings. Moreover, one of the most prominent predictors of
suicide is inpatient hospitalization, though it is unclear from existing evidence whether
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this is a correlative or causal link (See e.g. Qin and Nordentoft 2005). Although I am
sympathetic to the idea, to argue against any form of inpatient treatment is beyond the
scope of this project. What is clear from the foregoing analysis is that people are
frequently hospitalized or arrested prior to receiving services and that in many of these
cases, such treatment is unnecessary. If there were expanded community supports in
place, many people who are currently served in inpatient settings might be better served
in their respective communities.
4.4 Radical Abolition, Peer Support, and Anti-Psychiatry
At this point, I would be remiss if I did not consider the most prominent
alternative to Olmstead frameworks—the idea that institutional settings should be
abolished altogether. For example, Ben-Moshe (2014; 2020) argues for a radical abolition
of psychiatry and carceral settings (including institutions). She suggests that abolition
offers a useful framework for imagining a “noncarceral future” which transcends the
policing and institutionalization of disabled people, especially in the I/DD and psychiatric
disability communities (Ben-Moshe 2014, 268). Beyond merely changing the locale of
service provision, an abolitionist approach seeks to undermine the epistemologies that
lead to the needless incarceration and control over the lives of disabled people. As BenMoshe notes:
Community services are certainly smaller and more dispersed, but the relations of
power/knowledge at their core remain intact. Professionals created the programs
and run them with little change or input from service users. Under these
conditions, it is not very surprising that many of these services foster further
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segregation and marginalization of people with disabilities… The goal is not to
replace one form of control…for another (2014, 268-69).
Ben-Moshe suggests that disabled people themselves are organizing abolitionist
alternatives to repressive service provision that upend traditional psychiatry and notions
of “cure.”
A prime example is mental health consumer-led anti-psychiatry initiatives.
Stastny and Lehmann (2007) compiled the narratives of 61 therapists, psychiatrists, social
scientists, lawyers, relatives, and ex-patients to document non-coercive and non-medical
mechanisms for coping with the symptoms of psychiatric disabilities. Many of the
suggestions are relatively mundane, including exercise and meditation. However, there
are many other examples of consumers organizing independently to provide peer support
to one another and to manage their symptoms without resorting to traditional psychiatric
treatment. One such experiment, Soteria, provided accommodations for up to seven
schizophrenic people experiencing psychotic breaks at a time. Soteria offered a
communal, therapeutic living environment where mental health consumers built their
skills and coping tactics. One of the driving principles behind Soteria was that psychiatric
medications should not be used for six weeks and should only be used as a last resort if
other therapeutic approaches failed. The Soteria model proved successful in treating
“psychotic breaks” and preventing acute, inpatient hospitalization for many mental health
consumers. Two-year outcomes were generally better among patients treated at Soteria,
and only 19 percent of patients were continuously maintained on antipsychotic
medications. This ultimately allowed most consumers treated at Soteria to integrate back
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into their communities after their episodes had subsided, many without the assistance of
psychiatric medication (See Bola and Mosher 2003; Mosher 1999).
Other models have been similarly successful. For example, Sweden operated a
supported housing “hotel” between 1995-2004 in which people could “check-in” for
indefinite periods of time. Maintenance workers were the only professionals available.
This hotel was frequently utilized by people with psychiatric disabilities, prisoners
seeking to reintegrate into society, or other populations for which apartment hunting
might prove difficult or stressful (Ben-Moshe 2014, 261). In North America, Second
Opinion Society in Yukon Canada is a psychiatric survivor-run service that provides
drop-in lunches, holistic healing approaches and advocacy services for local people in
need of services (Ben-Moshe 2014, 261). Finally, online communities have also proven
to be effective tools for consumers who want to avoid traditional psychiatry. For
example, The Icarus Project96 is an online collective dedicated to people with bipolar
disorder. Instead of pathologizing bipolar disorder, people in this collective view it as a
“dangerous gift” that needs to be cultivated and taken care of. Coping strategies are
emphasized rather than medical interventions, and people can seek assistance through
online forums.
These models are all highly contentious within the psychiatric community.
However, one might flip that sentiment and argue that traditional psychiatry is highly
controversial within the disability community. Psychiatry creates an unequal balance of

96

The Icarus Project NYC (last accessed Aug. 4, 2020), http://nycicarus.org/.

77
power between patients and medical professionals. Some psychiatrists harbor a distrust of
the populations they work with, and many seek to utilize medications as a first-line
intervention. Psychiatrists have historically been complicit in legally enforceable
institutionalization against people with mental health disabilities. They have also engaged
in contentious practices such as forced medication. The majority of mental health
consumers who have been placed in inpatient settings are rightfully traumatized as the
result of the treatment (or lack thereof) that they received (See e.g. Stefan 2016).
Psychiatrists must contend with this history and the learned distrust of many members of
the disability community. Services provided in the community must ultimately empower
disabled people to make their own decisions, rather than merely providing coercive
services in community settings.
That said, many people with mental health disabilities rely on traditional
psychiatry to manage symptoms that range from unpleasant to intolerable. Whether to do
so can and should be an individual’s prerogative. As such, this project does not adopt a
staunch anti-psychiatry perspective. Rather, I argue that the core tenet of abolitionist
approaches should be acknowledged—that the power relationships inherent to certain
models of service provision are coercive and unequal. Those power relationships are
what I seek to abolish, rather than the practice of psychiatry wholesale. People should
have a full range of service options available to them in their communities—whether they
prefer medication-based approaches or more peer-supportive models.
This section therefore takes two key insights from the abolitionist approach: (1)
coercive service provision in the community is not a suitable alternative to segregated
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institutional services, and (2) psychiatrists who work with members of the disability
community must be cognizant of practices like supported decision-making and enable
their patients to make decisions for themselves regarding their medical treatment. A wide
range of services should be offered in the community—and receive governmental
funding—so that people with psychiatric disabilities and I/DD are enabled to make
genuine choices regarding their treatment.
5. Conclusion
This Chapter makes three central claims: (1) although the idea that
deinstitutionalization is responsible for a host of social ills is widely accepted, naïve
integration rather than integration itself is the more likely culprit for these problems; (2)
Olmstead litigation is a necessary but insufficient tool to overcome the segregation of
disabled people; (3) systemic policy change motivated by the ideals of Olmstead is the
most effective mechanism for bringing about supported integration.
Naïve integration, as I have noted multiple times, is a mindset that pervades
disability policy. Naïve integration advocates for integration at all cost; however, the
underlying goal of naïve integration is to absolve the government of its responsibility to
provide the community-based supports necessary to further integration. Naïve integration
is in this sense hollow rhetoric. True integration requires the provision of intensive
supports in the community such that people do not need to be segregated. Integration is
not a replacement for the services provided in segregated settings but rather should be
supplemented with services tailored to furthering the goals of integration. As argued in
Chapter 1, this is the best way to ensure that disabled people enjoy basic freedoms, such
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as freedom of association. Even if individual disabled people ultimately decide to pursue
a segregated lifestyle, the option of integration is a prerequisite to this decision.
The logic of presumptive segregation and the logic of naïve integration are both
underpinned by ableism. The goal of institutions was all along to protect disabled people
from society, as if they need protection as opposed to a society in which their needs are
understood and validated. Conversely, the goal of naïve integrationism is to ignore that
disabled people’s needs exist altogether. Naïve integrationism is analogous to “colorblindness” in this way.
Substantial research has documented that integration works when the appropriate
services are provided; however, naïve integration has been used as a red herring in the
debate about disability service provision to re-entrench segregation. The focus of
disability scholarship should align itself with the disability community, which generally
eschews both naïve integrationism and segregation.
That said, many barriers exist to creating true integration. For instance, state and
municipal governments frequently suffer from a shortage of resources. However, the
responsibility for providing health, education, housing, and other public services falls
largely on state and local governments. Integrated service provision can create significant
savings in the long-term by avoiding the exorbitant expenses associated with mass
incarceration and inpatient hospital care. However, policymakers must be convinced of
the value of integrated service provision first. The logic of naïve integrationism and the
ableism that underlies it must be replaced with a more social understanding of disability
injustice—that although not all harms faced by disabled people are socially constructed,
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society is responsible for constructing the idea of “normalcy” that paints disabled
people’s needs as “abnormal” and an “individual responsibility.”
The logic of naïve integration is contingent. It can be displaced when scholars and
policymakers take seriously the idea that disabled people deserve support not for
paternalistic reasons but because society has framed their needs as beyond the scope of
collective responsibility. Taking collective responsibility through true integration can
overcome both naïve integrationism and paternalism, two key injustices faced by the
disability community. As this project has and will argue, the Olmstead mandate is and
will be critical to dismantling naïve integrationism. The idea that people should not be
presumptively segregated in state service provision is simultaneously radical and
common sense, and Olmstead litigation and policy advocacy can help open people’s
minds to the possibility of a different future for disabled people.
In the chapters that follow, I analyze the ways in which naïve integrationism has
pervaded education and employment jurisprudence and policy. I also look at the ways in
which Olmstead litigation can and has been effective at undoing the presumption that
disabled people belong in segregated spaces.
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Chapter 3: The Integration Presumption in Disability Education
“In a case where the segregated facility is considered superior, the court should
determine whether the services which make that placement superior could be feasibly
provided in a non-segregated setting.”
–Roncker on Behalf of Roncker v. Walter 97
“What he must remember is that there is no magic, either in mixed schools or in
segregated schools. A mixed school with poor and unsympathetic teachers, with hostile
public opinion, and no teaching of truth concerning black folk, is bad. A segregated
school with ignorant placeholders, inadequate equipment, poor salaries, and wretched
housing, is equally bad. Other things being equal, the mixed school is the broader, more
natural basis for the education of all youth. It gives wider contacts; it inspires greater
self-confidence; and suppresses the inferiority complex.”
–W.E.B. DuBois, “Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?”

1. Introduction
In 1977, Amy Rowley, a hearing-impaired student, entered kindergarten. She was
an exceptionally bright student and could read lips. During her Individualized Education
Program (IEP) meeting, it was decided that Amy would attend school in a mainstream
classroom and be provided with an FM hearing aid that would enable her to hear her
teachers and classmates during certain activities. Amy successfully completed
kindergarten.
When Amy was entering First grade, her parents requested that her IEP include
the provision of a qualified sign language interpreter in lieu of other supportive
provisions in her previous IEP. The administration, followed by an independent
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examiner, denied this request on the basis that Amy “was achieving educationally,
academically, and socially” without such assistance.
The Rowleys appealed this decision before a trial court. The Court determined
there was a substantial gap between Amy’s potential educational achievement and her
current performance. The Court found that Amy was “remarkably well-adjusted” and had
“extraordinary rapport” with her teachers and peers. Nonetheless, Amy could only
understand approximately 59 per cent of the words spoken to her, while she could
identify 100 per cent of the words signed to her. This lead the Southern District of New
York to conclude that there was a substantial gap between her potential and current
performance.98
Rowley’s case was heard before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1982. 99 However, the
Supreme Court held that the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
(EAHC, now IDEA) created no requirement that individualized services provided to
children be sufficient to maximize each child's potential "commensurate with the
opportunity provided other children."100 Rather, the metric set by the court was grade-
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level appropriate attainment. 101 Because Amy Rowley was performing at her grade level,
it did not matter to the Court that she was not reaching her potential. 102
Rowley set a low bar for school districts in tailoring IEPs. Instead of looking at the
child’s potential and developing a set of individualized services aimed at achieving that
potential, Rowley merely requires individualized services commensurate with the
student’s grade-level. It is my contention in this chapter that Rowley and many of the
cases that followed set precedents that made “naïve integrationism” the law of the land
for disabled students.
In this chapter, I begin by discussing the standard set by the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), comparing the plain text of the statute to the Court’s
interpretation in Rowley. I then turn to counter claims that the appropriate response to
naïve integrationism in this context is to advocate for segregation. I conclude by
discussing promising steps the Supreme Court has taken to move away from naïve
integrationism in recent rulings such as Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District 103
and Fry v. Napoleon Community School, 104 arguing that such cases set precedents for
more ambitious test cases by disability rights litigators. I maintain that the framework set
forth in Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring 105 is more effective than IDEA-based jurisprudence,
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as the ADA moves beyond naïve integrationism to demand that community services be
provided in the least restrictive settings. 106
2. Rowley, the Supreme Court, and Naïve Integrationism
Rowley had extraordinary effects on education case law that have only recently
begun to be unraveled and partially overturned by the Supreme Court in cases such as
Fry and Endrew F (Colker 2017). This section discusses the courts’ tendency toward
naïve integrationism post-Rowley, concluding that many of the problems critics such as
Colker (2008) identify with the integration presumption in education stem from the
tendency toward naïve rather than supportive attempts to integrate disabled students. I
begin by discussing the legislative and jurisprudential history of the IDEA in order to set
the backdrop for the discussion that follows in Section 2.2 about Rowley and subsequent
court decisions.
2.1 The IDEA and the History of Disability Education Jurisprudence
Education is perhaps the issue that transformed the disability rights movement
into a movement for civil rights. Early case law on disability education mirrored the
arguments advanced in Brown v. Board of Education, and for good reason.107 Prior to the
passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA)108 in 1975, over one
million disabled children received no education, and over half of disabled children who
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were in school did not receive the requisite specialized services (Fleischer and Zames
2011). The ideals that eventually underscored the IDEA, such as a free and appropriate
public education (FAPE) in the least restrictive environment (LRE) were established by
two cases: PARC v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (1971) and Mills v. Board of
Education (1972). The provisions of the IDEA have been hotly contested in courts, as
parents have attempted to secure an adequate education for their children from
chronically underfunded school districts.
The EHA was a direct legislative response to PARC and Mills. PARC ruled in
favor of the plaintiffs on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, holding that the state is
obligated to provide every mentally disabled child with access to a free public
education.109 Mills expanded this precedent, holding that every child is entitled to a free
public education, irrespective of the nature or severity of the child’s disability. 110 The
EHA and the Development Disabilities and Bill of Rights Act was passed in 1975 in
response to and embracing the principles of PARC and Mills. The EHA (now IDEA)
requires that individual states find, identify, and assess all children with disabilities
within the state and tailor educational programs to suit the particular needs of children
through the creation of “individualized education programs” (IEPs)111. It relies on the
principles of a free and appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment.
The purpose of the act was to “[extend] to children with disabilities the principles of
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equality of educational opportunities underlying the landmark 1954 Supreme Court
decision in Brown v. Board of Education” (Fleischer and Zames 2001, 185).
Though the IDEA has origins in Fourteenth Amendment civil rights litigation,
commentators such as Bagenstos (2009) have noted that courts subsequently construed
the IDEA as a piece of benefits legislation, rather than a civil rights act for students.
Specifically, courts have held that IDEA is not an anti-discrimination statute but rather an
entitlement program with specific requirements for qualification and explicit limits on the
breadth of benefits it provides.112 Moreover, the fact that disability discrimination merely
receives rational scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment 113 means that it receives the
lowest level of constitutional security of any protected class. Almost any state interest
other than explicit animus is sufficient to override a disability equal protection claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment. This is the reason that disability advocates, as
discussed in Section 4, have either construed the IDEA in novel ways or turned to the
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Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in order to create parity between students with
and without disabilities.
2.2 Rowley, FAPE, and the Turn Toward Naïve Integrationism
Amy Rowley’s case set an enduring precedent that embedded naïve
integrationism in IDEA jurisprudence. In this case, the Court explicitly rejected the idea
of substantive equality for students with disabilities by eschewing results-based metrics
and the idea of a student’s “potential” as factors in determining whether they were
receiving FAPE. After Rowley, students and parents appealing disability discrimination
could no longer use the IDEA as a means of doing so. Rather, the bill became an
entitlement program, with explicit boundaries set for both who qualified and what
benefits they could hope to receive.
Rowley is a prime example of naïve integrationism, because it is a case where a
student was expected to be integrated pursuant to federal law; however, the school district
and courts were unwilling to provide the requisite resources and community supports to
achieve substantive equality or true integration. Amy Rowley’s legitimate need for an
American Sign Language (ASL) interpreter was denied simply because she was
intelligent enough to perform at her grade level despite understanding very little of what
was happening in the classroom.
Despite its roots in Fourteenth Amendment litigation, the IDEA is ironically not
understood as a civil rights bill by federal courts. Therefore, Courts have held that it does
not demand substantive equality or integration for students. Rather than creating a
demanding standard, the Supreme Court set minimal requirements for grade-level
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progression. As the Dissent penned by Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall noted, this
standard does not even provide a baseline level of formal equality—indeed, “the basic
floor of opportunity is intended to eliminate the effects of a handicap [sic], at least to the
extent that the child will be given an equal opportunity to learn if that is reasonably
possible.”114 However, the IDEA, as interpreted, does not provide this equal opportunity
to learn, but rather provides something more minimal. Therefore, the IDEA does not
provide formal equality, let alone substantive equality, for students with disabilities.
In addition to facing courts’ tendency toward naïve integrationism in IDEA
litigation, parents generally face additional barriers in successfully litigating IDEA cases
due to the level of deference afforded to educational professionals in determining what
constitutes an appropriate IEP. The Ninth Circuit held in County of San Diego v.
California Special Education Hearing Office:
The court reviews de novo the appropriateness of a special education placement
under the IDEA. Nevertheless, when reviewing state administrative decisions,
courts must give due weight to judgments of education policy. Therefore,
the IDEA does not empower courts to substitute their own notions of sound
educational policy for those of the school authorities which they
review. (emphasis added)
This case and similar decisions indicate that heightened deference continues to be given
to educational professionals, teachers, school administrators, physicians, and social
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workers when drafting IEPs, and parents often lack the legal savvy to navigate the
process alone (Fleischer and Zames 2012, 185). Commentators have noted that this is
especially true for families who are poor, uneducated, not fluent in English, or a member
of a racial or ethnic minority groups (See Fleischer and Zames 2012).
Naïve integrationism coupled with substantial deference to school authorities has
stacked the deck against parents seeking to litigate in favor of better educational
opportunities for their children under the IDEA. One immediate policy response to this
naïve integrationism might be to segregate children and provide more specialized
disability services in separate environments. The next section pushes back against such
proposals by suggesting that: (1) students can generally flourish when they are provided
services in place—that is to say, provided community supports in the most integrated
settings, and (2) the reason many students have not been able to secure such supports is
due to the low bar for educational attainment set by the IDEA and the naïve integrationist
precedents that followed its passage.
3.3 Rachel Holland, Neill Roncker, and the Least Restrictive Environment
One of the more controversial mandates of the IDEA is that it requires that
education be provided in the most integrated and “least restrictive environment,” (LRE)
which, in practice means that education must be provided in the most integrated setting
possible. Colker (2009) argues extensively against this “integration presumption,”
suggesting that integrated environments are not always best for students with disabilities,
and as a matter of policy, we should focus our attention on the attainment of educational
and social outcomes for students with disabilities—what she terms “substantive
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equality.” This section interrogates the idea that substantive equality can be achieved
without a strong presumption in favor of integration. I maintain that most, if not all,
children with disabilities can benefit from integrated settings and establish this premise
through case law on LRE requirements.
The seminal case on LRE is Sacramento City Board of Education v. Rachel H.115
Rachel Holland was an 11-year-old child with mental disabilities. Her IQ was estimated
at 44, and she attended special education programs in her school district from 1985-89. In
1989, her parents requested that she be put in a regular classroom full-time; however, the
District rejected their request, proposing a placement that divided Rachel’s time between
special and regular education classrooms—a placement that would have required Rachel
to move between classrooms 6 times per day. 116 Because of the District’s noncompliance,
the Hollands enrolled Rachel in a regular kindergarten class at a private school, where
she remained in regular classes until the second grade, when the District Court rendered
its opinion in her case.
The parents and the school district disagreed as to whether Rachel would be better
served in a segregated or integrated setting. Her parents argued that she learned social
and academic skills better in a regular classroom than she would in a segregated setting,
while the School District argued that she was too severely disabled to benefit from being
in a fully-integrated setting.117 A hearing officer found that: (1) Rachel was motivated to
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learn in her integrated classroom by imitation and modelling and therefore achieved
better academic outcomes; (2) she was not disruptive in an integrated setting, and (3) the
School District overstated the cost of placing her in an integrated setting. 118 The District
Court agreed with the findings of the hearing officer, and the decision was affirmed by
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 119
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court’s findings that Rachel received
substantial academic and non-academic benefits from being in an integrated setting.
Moreover, the Court held that she was not a detriment to other students—nor did she take
up too much of the teacher’s time. Indeed, Nina Crone, Rachel’s second-grade teacher
testified that Rachel was not disruptive and only required a part-time aide to fully benefit
from an integrated setting.120 The Court of Appeals also agreed with the District Court’s
finding that integrating Rachel was not too costly an endeavor. 121
The Ninth Circuit held that courts deciding whether to integrate students under the
IDEA must consider: “(1) the educational benefits of placement full-time in a regular
class; (2) the non-academic benefits of such placement; (3) the effect [the student has] on
the teacher and children in the regular class; and (4) the costs of mainstreaming [the
student].” This mandate, it must be noted, is subject to the limitations set forth in Rowley.
However, Rachel Holland is an exemplar of how integration can work and does work for
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some students who might otherwise be put into segregated settings. Why, when
integration can produce positive outcomes, might people be skeptical of its value?
The reasons to be skeptical of an integration presumption for all students are
illustrated well by Roncker On Behalf of Roncker v. Walter,122 heard by the Sixth Circuit
in 1983. In Roncker, the issue was whether Neill Roncker should have been
“mainstreamed.” Neill was nine years old and had an IQ below 50, which in his district
generally meant that he would be educated in a segregated setting. 123 His parents and
some clinical professionals thought that Neill would benefit from contact with nondisabled children; however, the School District decided to place him in a completely
segregated county school.124 The Ronckers disagreed with such a placement and appealed
to the Ohio State Board of Education, who found that Neill should be placed in the
county school but also given opportunities to interact with non-disabled peers. No
provision was made for how that was to be accomplished.125
Neill began to attend school in a segregated classroom at Pleasant Ridge, an
integrated public elementary school. His contact with non-disabled peers was limited to
lunch, the gym, and recess.126 At trial, both the School District and the parents agreed that
Neill could not be placed in integrated classrooms. However, the parents prioritized
contact with non-disabled peers, whereas, the School District emphasized the educational
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benefits of the county school. 127 The trial court held that the school district did not abuse
its discretion in placing Neill in a school where he would receive no contact with his nondisabled peers.128
This decision was reversed by the Sixth Circuit upon appeal. The Sixth Circuit
reasoned that:
The [IDEA] does not require mainstreaming in every case but its requirement that
mainstreaming be provided to the maximum extent appropriate indicates a very
strong congressional preference… The perception that a segregated institution is
academically superior for a handicapped child may reflect no more than a basic
disagreement with the mainstreaming concept. 129
The test, according to the Court, and in line with the holding in Rowley, is whether the
services that make a segregated setting superior can feasibly be provided in a nonsegregated setting.130 While the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that Neill was not making
process in his more integrated setting, the Court remanded the case to the District Court
to determine whether the services that were provided by the county school could be
provided at Pleasant Ridge.131
Colker argues that Roncker is a prime example of why the integration
presumption is inappropriate. She argues: “In a case like Roncker, however, the
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integration presumption seems to serve a cosmetic benefit—creating the appearance of
integration through the placement in a regular school—without the child having a
meaningful integrated experience” (2009, 106). Colker relies heavily on findings by the
District Court cited by the dissenting opinion in making this judgment:
Neill Roncker was not progressing in his present placement but was regressing.
His ability to interact with the non-handicapped children was at best minimal. His
opportunity to interact with non-handicapped children there was also very
minimal. Yet, despite these findings, the panel's decision requires the District
Court to determine on remand whether it would be “feasible” to provide an
equivalent of what is now provided in the 169 schools in classrooms located in
regular elementary schools. 132
These findings lead Colker to conclude that although the Court should have primarily
considered whether the disability-only institution was a high-level institution that would
have provided substantially more educational benefit to Neill, the preoccupation with
integration distracted the Court from considering what types of supports would have
yielded substantive equality.
Colker, in many places, presents a false dichotomy between segregated settings
where intensive, disability-specific services can be provided, and integrated settings
where they are not. However, I suggest that Colker’s real problem with rulings such as
Roncker is not the integration presumption but rather the presumption toward naïve
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integration. Because of the relatively low bar set by Rowley for determining when a
student is receiving FAPE, courts do not adequately focus on the educational
opportunities afforded to students with disabilities—indeed, they are encouraged to give
deference to school districts and determine only whether the district is providing gradeappropriate educational opportunities. One need not choose between robust educational
opportunities for students with disabilities and integrating them. It is not the integration
presumption but rather the presumption that students can be integrated without the
provision of adequate educational opportunities and supports that distorts peoples’ focus
away from substantive equality for students with disabilities.
In the case of Neill Roncker, Colker, as well as the dissenting and majority
opinions, portray Neill’s education in terms of this false dichotomy—better educational
opportunities in a completely segregated school or subpar educational opportunities in a
more integrated environment. I do not dispute that Neill needed robust services and
supports; however, it does not follow that Neill needed to be educated in a completely
segregated environment. Neill could have and should have been provided with robust
community services in an integrated school where he had the maximum opportunity to
interact with students who were non-disabled, as well as with disabled students. If
schools developed appropriate supports such that children could be educated in more
integrated environments, then children like Neill could receive the services they need in
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the community rather than separate from it. The problem is that community funding
streams provided only the option of a segregated school.
One of the reasons schools lack the resources to provide adequate community
supports in more integrated settings is that these resources are typically diverted to
segregated settings. This is a relic of perverse funding incentives built into early special
education legislation, which led to students being segregated because schools received
more money to educate students in segregated settings.133 However, it is not apparent that
segregated settings are necessary to educate students with disabilities. Nor are segregated
settings automatically preferable. Recent suits against The Georgia Network for
Educational and Therapeutic Support (GNETS) schools suggest that students educated in
segregated settings often receive inferior educational supports—students are being
siphoned off into segregated settings for minimal gains in educational attainment. 134 In
Sacramento, up to 50 per cent of students with disabilities are placed in segregated
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settings; yet, between 2008 and 2017, only one student in a segregated setting met state
high school graduation requirements.135
Neither segregated nor integrated settings guarantee equal educational
opportunities—they must both be buttressed by the appropriate supports, including
proper funding. However, assuming the necessary services can be provided in integrated
settings, which they often if not always can be, my claim is that integrated settings are:
(1) more equal than segregated settings when historical injustices and biases are taken
into account, and (2) likely to prompt both educational and psycho-social growth in ways
that cannot be achieved as robustly in segregated settings.
It is moreover important to note that the integration presumption is just that—a
presumption. It can be overridden in the minority of cases in which students can receive
no educational or social benefit from mainstreaming principles. I would suggest,
however, that these cases are probably rare, as empirical literature has extensively
documented the effects of integration on educational progress, social development, and
self-esteem for students with disabilities (See e.g. Ryndak, Jackson, and White 2013;
Sauer and Jorgenson 2016; Helmstetter 1988; Fisher and Meyer 2002). For example,
recent studies have demonstrated that students who spend more time in integrated settings
have higher test scores in reading and mathematics than students who spend most of their
time in segregated settings (Wagoner and Blockerby 2004; Blockorby 2007). That said,
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the purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical lens through which to criticize
decisions such as Roncker rather than a thorough review of the empirical evidence in
favor of integration. By reframing the problem as naïve integrationism rather than
integrationism more generally, it is possible to transcend the binary debate between
integrated vs. segregated settings. This will allow the conversation surrounding
mainstreaming to proceed to a more nuanced discussion that interrogates the failures of
some mainstreaming principles while still maintaining that integration is a constituent
feature of substantive equality for people with disabilities.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court has shown signs of moving away from the
minimalist standards set forth by Rowley. In the sections that follow, I discuss steps that
have been taken to mitigate or overturn the ill effects of Rowley (depending on which
commentator you believe). I then discuss why such steps might not necessarily be
fruitful. I conclude by discussing disability advocates’ attempts to hold school districts
accountable for providing robust community services by leveraging the Supreme Court’s
holding in Olmstead.
3. Endrew F. and Fry: The Supreme Court Steps Away from Naïve Integrationism
In recent years, the Supreme Court has taken steps to move beyond the standards
set by Rowley, and according to some commentators, has fully overturned Rowley in a
series of two decisions issued in the 2016-17 Supreme Court term (Colker 2017)—
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Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District136 and Fry v. Napoleon Community
Schools.137
3.1 Endrew F. and “Appropriately Ambitious” Goals
Endrew F. is an autistic child who had received annual IEPs from the Douglas
County School District from preschool to fourth grade. His parents became concerned
around fourth grade that his progress had stalled and therefore appealed the school
district’s IEP plan for his fifth-grade year, as it gave him roughly the same supports he
had previously been provided.138 Because the school refused to provide Endrew F. with
additional, more intensive services, the parents removed him from public schools and
enrolled him in a specialized private school, where it is alleged that he progressed
substantially. The parents then sought reimbursement from the school district for the
placement by appealing Endrew F.’s IEP.139 Both the District Court and the Tenth Circuit
denied their requests for reimbursement, with the Tenth Circuit interpreting Rowley to
mean that schools need only be “reasonably calculated” to provide students with “de
minimis” educational benefits.140 The Tenth Circuit’s ruling, it could be said, upheld the
principles of naïve integrationism in its interpretation of Rowley—it required that Endrew

136

137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).
137 S. Ct. 743 (2017).
138 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 991.
139
Id.
140 Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1338 (10th Cir. 2015)
137

100
F. be educated in a public school setting without the resources necessary to enable him to
make academic progress.
Many education advocates saw Endrew F. as a chance for the Supreme Court to
revisit and overturn the principles espoused in Rowley. For example, an amicus brief
written by the Bazelon Center and former Department of Education Officials suggested
that: (1) educational methods have become more sophisticated since Rowley, and (2) the
IDEA has changed since Rowley, such that the standards it espouses are no longer
appropriate for students with disabilities.141 The amicus brief poignantly argued:
No one would question that “appropriate” treatment for tuberculosis changed
dramatically with the development of antibiotics. Given the improvements in
teaching methods and assistive technologies, it is realistic and therefore
appropriate to set high expectations and high achievement goals for students with
disabilities.142
Although the Supreme Court ultimately did not overturn the primary holding of Rowley
for students performing at grade level, disability organizations such as the Bazelon
Center hailed the decision as “a significant step forward for students with disabilities and
their families” on the basis that it provides for a much more demanding standard than
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lower courts have typically required when applying Rowley’s analysis to cases involving
students who might not be performing at grade level.
The Supreme Court did maintain that the ways in which Rowley has been applied
by lower courts are wholly inappropriate for students who are not performing at and
arguably cannot perform at grade level—which includes many students with disabilities.
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that a student’s “educational program must be
appropriately ambitious in light of his circumstances, just as advancement from grade to
grade is appropriately ambitious for most children in the regular classroom.”143 Students
must be enabled to “make progress”—not merely achieve some nebulous educational
benefit.144 This holding overturned the Tenth Circuit’s ruling, 145 and remanded the case to
the District Court for further proceedings to determine whether Endrew F.’s IEP enabled
him to make progress toward “appropriately ambitious” goals. The District Court upon
remand found that: “the April 2010 IEP offered to [Endrew F.] by the District in this case
was insufficient to create an educational plan that was reasonably calculated to enable
Petitioner to make progress, even in light of his unique circumstances, based on the
continued pattern of unambitious goals and objectives of his prior IEPs.”146 The parents
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were therefore awarded damages in the amount the parents paid to send Endrew F. to the
private school which provided more intensive services.
While Endrew F. is not an example where a student benefited from public
education, it is easy to imagine that had he been provided intensive behavioral supports in
an integrated setting, he would have benefitted from them. The parents’ concern was not
the environment in which he was placed but rather the services that Endrew F. was being
provided (or lack thereof). Intensive behavioral services in the form of paraprofessional
assistance, counseling and therapy, and other behavioral interventions are routinely
offered in integrated settings. However, the school district chose not to provide them.
The result for Endrew, however, is not the most important result from this case.
Because of the precedent set by Endrew F., students with disabilities, their parents, and
advocacy organizations across the country have been equipped with the jurisprudential
tools to demand “appropriately ambitious” goals not “de minimis” progress. For example,
the National Youth Law Center, the Council of Parents Attorneys and Advocates
(COPAA), the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, and Disability Rights Oregon
have challenged the state of Oregon’s practice of providing shortened school days to
students under the standards set forth by Endrew F.147
Because Rowley is still good law for students who are achieving at grade-level,
naïve integrationism in some ways is still the law that governs the IDEA. However, for
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students who are not achieving at grade-level, courts can no longer accept nebulous, de
minimis educational benefits as being sufficient to constitute an IEP. Rather, students
with disabilities must be provided with the requisite opportunities to achieve real
academic progress in integrated settings as provided for by the IDEA.
3.2 Beyond the IDEA: Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools
Although Endrew F. was groundbreaking precedent, it did not overturn Rowley.
Fundamentally, under the IDEA, students are not entitled to equal educational
opportunity or progress. The IDEA is “simply not an anti-discrimination statute,” and
nothing about the holding in Endrew F. changes that.148 However, a more complicated
but arguably more groundbreaking decision was issued later in the Supreme Court’s term
in Fry.149
The central tension resolved by Fry was between §1415(l) of the IDEA and the
section’s requirement that suits brought that seek relief available under the IDEA first
exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures. §1415(l) provides that nothing in the
IDEA “restrict[s] or limit[s] the rights [or] remedies” provided by other federal laws,
particularly antidiscrimination statutes, for children with disabilities; however, if students
must first exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures, (1) bringing ADA claims
becomes cumbersome, and (2) plaintiffs are frequently denied damages under other civil
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rights bills, like the ADA and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act, because “appropriate” relief
has already been provided under the IDEA.
The Supreme Court in Smith v. Robinson150 had previously held that where
parents sought “virtually identical” claims under the ADA and §504 of the Rehabilitation
Act as the relief available under the IDEA, the IDEA foreclosed the additional claims. In
other words, the IDEA became the sole vehicle through which students could claim
disability-related protections from schools. However, Congress overturned Smith in a
provision of the IDEA by adding the exhaustion requirement in §1451(l). The first half of
§1415(l) reaffirms that the ADA and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act are “separate
vehicles” that are “no less integral than the IDEA ‘for ensuring the rights of handicapped
children.’”151
In Fry, the school district denied Ehlena Fry, a student with cerebral palsy’s,
request to bring her trained service dog, a goldendoodle named Wonder, to school with
her. Wonder met the ADA’s definition of a trained service animal, because he was
trained to perform tasks for her. In particular, Wonder aided Ehlena by: “retrieving
dropped items, helping her balance when she uses her walker, opening and closing doors,
turning on and off lights, helping her take off her coat, [and] helping her transfer to and
from the toilet.”152 Ehlena’s existing IEP provided for a human aid who provided one-on-
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one support for Ehlena throughout the day—therefore, Wonder was superfluous
according to school officials. 153
The Frys subsequently removed Ehlena from school and began to homeschool
her. They also filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil
Rights (OCR), raising claims under Title II of the ADA and §504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. The OCR agreed, explaining that under these statutes, schools are obligated to go
beyond merely providing educational services: “[a] school could offer a FAPE to a child
with a disability but still run afoul of the laws’ ban on discrimination.” 154 The OCR
findings stated that the school could have satisfied FAPE through the use of a human
aide; however, anti-discrimination laws required school officials, as state actors, to allow
Wonder into the classroom. In other words, the ADA and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act
require more than FAPE from schools in many cases. After the OCR findings, Ehlena’s
school district said that Wonder could come to school with her; however, the Frys,
worried about retaliation, found a different school in a different district where
“administrators and teachers enthusiastically received both E.F. and Wonder.” 155 They
then filed a suit in federal court seeking damages under the ADA and §504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.
The District Court originally dismissed the Frys’ suit, holding that they were
required to first exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures. The Sixth Circuit
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affirmed the ruling on similar grounds. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the harms to
Ehlena were generally “educational”—Wonder’s absence primarily harmed Ehlena’s
independence and social confidence at school. Therefore, the IDEA’s exhaustion
requirements applied, according to the divided panel. 156 It is important to note that before
going to the Supreme Court, both parties in the litigation agreed that the Sixth Circuit’s
standard went too far and potentially denied plaintiffs relief that is not available under the
IDEA.157
The Supreme Court held in favor of the Frys. The Court reasoned that the purpose
of the IDEA is to ensure FAPE for all students with disabilities. Therefore, FAPE is the
“yardstick” for “measuring the adequacy of the education that a school offers to a child
with a disability.”158 The administrative procedures under the IDEA test just that—
whether a school has met its FAPE requirements. In a case that merely contests the denial
of FAPE, plaintiffs cannot escape exhaustion requirements by bringing their suits under
other statutes.159 However, if plaintiffs are seeking accommodations, the denial of which
creates harms independent and separate from FAPE denial, claims seeking such
accommodations or damages for not providing them are not subject to the exhaustion
requirement under §1415(l) of the IDEA. 160 The Court reasoned that this is because the
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sole duty of administrative officers in FAPE hearings is to determine that FAPE is being
provided—they cannot provide any other form of relief.
That said, is sometimes difficult for courts to tell when plaintiffs are seeking relief
for the denial of FAPE and when she is seeking relief for something unrelated to FAPE.
The Supreme Court held that it is necessary to look to the substance of a plaintiff’s
claims instead of the labels being used—that is to say the “gravamen—of the plaintiff’s
complaint, setting aside any attempts at artful pleading.”161 If a plaintiff is contesting the
adequacy of educational benefits provided, then that plaintiff must first exhaust; however,
if, as in Ehlena’s case, the plaintiff is seeking relief that is not directly related to the
adequacy of their education but rather a required accommodation, exhaustion is not
required in a post-Fry world.
The opinion, written by Justice Kagan, outlined two questions that test whether
the gravamen of a complaint is an IDEA claim or other type of anti-discrimination claim:
[C]ould the plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim if the alleged
conduct had occurred at a public facility that was not a school—say, a public
theater or library? And second, could an adult at the school—say, an employee or
visitor—have pressed essentially the same grievance?162
Thus, the ruling in Fry is both narrow and broad simultaneously. For students, such as
Amy Rowley, the holding in Fry might have permitted substantial relief. Amy’s
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accommodation request (a qualified ASL interpreter), as Colker (2017) notes, clearly
falls within the purview of an accommodation that a public facility would be required to
provide or that the school itself would have been required to provide to a visitor.
By clearly articulating that students are entitled to accommodations not provided
by the IDEA, the Court in Fry transcended naïve integrationism somewhat. However, the
Court tempered this move with dicta aimed at preventing inventive pleading that would
make it so people could bring educational claims under the ADA or §504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. Ironically, Fry overturned the actual holding of Rowley; however, it
did not erase its legacy in IDEA litigation, as discussed in Section 3.1. Naïve
integrationism remains the law of the land in education policy to the extent that courts
follow the requirements of Rowley, Endrew F. and Fry.
4. The Promises of Olmstead
Although naïve integrationism is currently binding precedent, creative pleading
by disability advocacy organization and cause lawyers has the potential to disrupt the
pattern of naïve integrationism in federal disability education jurisprudence. This section
discusses the ramifications of the Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead v. L.C. by
Zimring163 for disability jurisprudence going forward.
Olmstead, discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, is broadly viewed as a
mechanism to challenge the unnecessary segregation and institutionalization of people
with disabilities. It has been used to challenge the unnecessary institutionalization in
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hospital settings but has also been used by advocates to challenge the placement of
people with disabilities in sheltered workshops,164 and is beginning to be used as a
theoretical basis for challenging the needless segregation of students with disabilities in
educational settings.165 Title II of the ADA and therefore the Olmstead mandate arguably
apply to schools, because they are state-run services, and Title II prohibits discrimination
against qualified individuals with disabilities in all programs, activities, and services of
public entities.
The Department of Justice in 2016 initiated a lawsuit against the Georgia Network
for Educational and Therapeutic Support (GNETS), a segregated school system
maintained for students with disabilities “who might otherwise require residential or
other more restrictive placements.”166 The schools, often maintained in Jim Crowe-era
buildings, do not provide students with grade-level-appropriate instruction and
completely segregate students with disabilities from their non-disabled peers.167 The
Department of Justice relied entirely on an Olmstead theory, rather than any IDEA claims
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in its complaint, claiming that: (1) GNETS programs are segregated, institutional settings,
(2) the institutions operate to the detriment of integrated alternatives, (3) GNETS students
are qualified to receive supports in more integrated settings and do not oppose the
provision of these supports in more integrated settings, and (4) the state could reasonably
modify these programs and provide them in more integrated, less restrictive settings. 168
Likewise, a complaint filed in early 2019 in the matter of J.N. v. Oregon
Department of Education represents a novel legal approach to the unnecessary discipline
and education of students using an Olmstead claim. The Complaint asserts that Oregon
has violated Title II of the ADA and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act by unnecessarily
shortening the school day of hundreds of students with disabilities.169 Specifically, the
Complaint argues that:
State agencies and officials thus may not permit practices that result in the
unnecessary segregation of children with disabilities who can be educated
effectively for the full day in school alongside their nondisabled peers if given
needed services and supports. Congress enacted the ADA and Section 504 to
directly address the discrimination that people with disabilities face when they are
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unnecessarily excluded from public life, such as the public-school system, due to
their disabilities.170
Moreover, the Complaint alleges that Title II of the ADA “prohibits the unnecessary
segregation of individuals with disabilities and requires public entities to administer their
services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs
of qualified individuals with disabilities.”171
These claims are novel and arguably fall squarely within the Olmstead mandate.
Olmstead requires any "public entity [to] administer . . . programs . . . in the most
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities."172
Moreover, "the treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with developmental
disabilities . . . should be provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the person's
personal liberty." 173 These holdings combined mean that in cases in which qualified
individuals with disabilities can be provided services in the community rather than in
segregated settings, there is a legal presumption that these services ought to be provided
in the community.
Educational entities, such as schools, are arguably subject to the Olmstead
mandate. Schools, under the Fry and Endrew F. rulings, have the twin obligations of
providing FAPE but also providing: (1) any services that must be provided in other places
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of public accommodation (such as a hospital), or (2) that an adult in the school would be
entitled to receive. Necessary behavioral supports to stay in the classroom arguably fall
under the first category of services—as schools provide behavioral and counselling
services, they are obliged via Olmstead to provide these services in the most integrated
setting. To prevent exclusion of people with disabilities from public life, schools are
required to make reasonable accommodations for students, which arguably includes
behavioral supports. While shortened school days almost undoubtedly violate FAPE, they
also fall awry of the Olmstead mandate to provide services in-place, rather than in
segregated settings.
In this way, the ruling in Fry has substantially clarified schools’ legal duties.
Colker argues that the ADA and Fry may be used to argue for ASL interpreters for
students who need them; however, I would argue that the Fry decision also has important
consequences for cognitively disabled students as well. Behavioral supports may or may
not be part and parcel of providing FAPE, but they arguably go beyond the bounds of
FAPE. They are services that are: (1) provided by a public entity, and (2) enable the
integration of students with disabilities in their respective communities. Title II of the
ADA therefore creates much more demanding standards for schools than have been
previously acknowledged by courts—and courts may be forced to acknowledge these
more demanding standards in light of Fry.
Although it is possible to put forth a plausible legal theory mandating that schools
provide these services in the most integrated setting and least restrictive environments, it
is unclear whether courts will adopt this standard. The one court in which this issue has
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been tried has given mixed signals regarding Olmstead theories as applied in an
educational context, ultimately ruling in favor of defendants.
In 2015, a class of plaintiffs sued the City of Springfield MA in S.S. ex rel. S.Y. v.
City of Springfield,174 asserting that the City’s decision to place students with disabilities
in segregated, inferior schools rather than “neighborhood schools” ran afoul of Title II of
the ADA’s integration mandate. Although the Complaint acknowledged that these
students were receiving FAPE, it claimed that they were receiving FAPE in a segregated
setting, which violated the principles of Olmstead in the ways outlined above. Defendants
filed a motion to dismiss based on the plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim under Title II of
the ADA; however, the District Court denied the motion on the grounds that that:
“Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants discriminated against S.S. in violation of Title II
by placing S.S. in a segregated educational environment even though, had he been
provided with reasonable accommodations, he could have been placed in a neighborhood
school," and that "plaintiffs have adequately pled that the exclusion of S.S. from the
neighborhood schools was by reason of his disability."175
However, the District Court in this matter later ruled in favor of defendants,
suggesting that the claims being alleged were IDEA claims masquerading as ADA
claims.176 The judge referenced the two questions asked in Fry—whether similar services
would need to be provided by other public entities, and whether an adult at the school
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could petition for the same services to be provided. The judge in his ruling reasoned that:
“Plaintiffs assert their case is an ‘equal access’ case, rather than one seeking FAPE, yet
when these two hypotheticals are asked of the ADA claim in this case, the answer to both
is clearly no.”177 Because of this, the Court found that plaintiffs needed to exhaust the
procedures provided by the IDEA.
However, it is important to note that this holding was limited to the specific
circumstances of this case—the Court was initially sympathetic to the argument that there
might have been a gap between FAPE and the ADA in terms of what Springfield schools
were required to provide. However, the named plaintiff dropped out of the case, leaving
only the associational plaintiffs—organizations that represent people with disabilities
rather than individual plaintiffs with disabilities. 178 It is unclear what the Court would
have held had the case involved both named, individual plaintiffs in addition to
associational plaintiffs.
Nonetheless, the question of whether Olmstead can be reasonably applied to
educational contexts is a live one. In many of the cases where the theories have been
raised, there have been settlement agreements. Therefore, precedent does not yet exist to
confirm or deny Olmstead’s application in a K-12 context. However, based on the
arguments made above, it seems likely that courts will hold schools accountable via not
only the IDEA but also the ADA in future. This has significant consequences for the
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future of naïve integrationism—Olmstead is a far more robust ruling than any of the
previous IDEA-based precedent. It requires the provision of adequate services to enable
people to flourish in community contexts and therefore might provide a way for courts to
transcend naïve integrationism without abandoning IDEA-based precedent.
5. Conclusion
This chapter has documented the history of naïve integrationism in education
jurisprudence. As argued, it seems difficult, if not impossible, to separate the mandates of
the IDEA from naïve integrationism. The IDEA requires students to be integrated insofar
as possible; however, because the IDEA is not an anti-discrimination bill, it does not
require that students receive the supports that they might need to flourish in integrated
settings. Therefore, while Endrew F. means that the standard in IDEA cases is no longer
de minimis, the standard still fails to achieve sufficiently ambitious goals for students like
Amy Rowley who might be high-achieving students yet held back by schools’ failures to
accommodate their disabilities. However, this chapter has also revealed a promising way
forward through the Olmstead mandate. Because Olmstead requires that all public
entities, including schools, take sweeping steps to end the unnecessary segregation of
students with disabilities, it seems likely that Olmstead litigation could address some of
the gaps between school districts’ obligations to provide FAPE and the services that
students with disabilities need to actually flourish in integrated settings.
How might the cases of Amy Rowley and Neill Roncker have been decided if the
tests implemented by Fry and Endrew F. been applied? It seems reasonable to assume
that in a post-Fry world, Amy Rowley would have received the accommodations she
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requested, just as any adult employee or visitor of the school would have been entitled to
an ASL interpreter. However, the case of Neill Roncker is less clear. Under Fry’s
framework, a meaningful gap between the provision of FAPE and the supports that the
ADA requires means that students like Neill would be entitled to receive the necessary
community supports in an integrated setting insofar as possible. Moreover, as I have
argued, the Olmstead mandate means that segregated schools might run afoul of Title II
of the ADA. Therefore, it is more likely that the intensive services that Neill needed to
make educational progress would have been provided in an integrated school, even if he
had been in a segregated classroom.
Why does this matter? Why push to integrate students? Is disability dissimilar to
gender, where segregated colleges have proven to be effective ways to educate young
women? It is true that students can make academic and social progress in segregated
environments. However, the odds are stacked against disabled students who are placed in
completely segregated settings. First, there is a risk of stereotyping and role segregation.
Students who grow up in segregated settings are not given the opportunity to interact on
an equal basis with their peers and therefore cannot decide whether they would like to in
the future. Whereas there is little doubt that women educated in sex-segregated schools
will go on to join an integrated workforce, the same expectations do not exist for disabled
students. State-sanctioned integration, insofar as possible, therefore allows maximal
choice as disabled youth proceed into adulthood. Moreover, segregated services deprive
students of the ability to interact with their peers—and therefore are arguably less suited
to students’ social development. The current narrative regarding education presumes that
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disabled children cannot simultaneously reap the social benefits of integration and the
educational supports provided in segregated settings—but what if they could? What if the
only reason students fail to achieve academically in integrated settings is the lack of
disability-specific services? Disability-specific services are vital government services and
ought to be provided in either segregated or integrated settings. However, a preference
toward segregated settings: (1) sets the expectation that segregation is a normal part of
being disabled, and (2) denies disabled students many of the social and extracurricular
benefits associated with being in a mainstreamed classroom.
This chapter supports the premise that people with disabilities should be
integrated insofar as possible. Far from detracting from substantive equality, the
integration presumption is a vital component of substantive equality. Integrated schools
do not guarantee equality; however, separate schools are not fundamentally equal either.
The problems that commentators like Colker have raised should be addressed by more
thorough and substantive attempts to integrate students properly rather than placing them
in segregated settings. The problem currently plaguing the American educational system
is naïve integrationism rather than the integration presumption itself. Students can and
should be served in the most integrated setting and least restrictive environment possible,
and the theories advanced by Olmstead litigation in the educational context provide a
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glimpse at a promising way to meaningfully reform the special education system through
systematic, strategic legal action.
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Chapter 4: A Way Forward Toward Integrated Employment
“In the workshop, they are supposed to help you get out and get a real job—but they
don’t. They always say I’m ‘not ready’—but I am.”
Peggy Carney (member of Speaking for Ourselves)

1. Introduction
Poverty and disability are endogenous—poverty causes disability, and the
structural injustices associated with disability cause poverty. Disabled people are
approximately twelve per cent of the population but make up over half of American
citizens living in long-term poverty (NCD 2017). The introduction to this project
discussed some of the reasons for this—disabled people are deterred from working by the
very programs through which they fund their existence (and their healthcare services).
Moreover, when disabled people enter the workplace, they are frequently role
stereotyped. Frequently, disabled people are placed in “sheltered workshops” without
their consent, where they are paid subminimum wage.
Poverty is a major barrier to community integration for disabled people, and
therefore, attention must be paid to the laws and policies that perpetuate impoverishment.
This Chapter argues that the fault is largely in the structure of our employment programs.
Instead of incentivizing competitive, integrated employment and protecting disabled
employees, our incentive structures deter people from working. Moreover, once disabled
people enter the workplace, they frequently lack the necessary supports and are not
served by the civil rights laws that are supposed to protect them. This Chapter makes
three main arguments: (1) The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), especially the
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Title I employment mandate, reinforces naïve integrationism in the field of employment;
(2) The Olmstead integration mandate has been successful in ending one employment
practice that has historically harmed disabled people—sheltered workshops; and (3) the
Olmstead mandate is itself insufficient to create employment opportunities—systemic
policy changes in the spirit of Olmstead must be taken to remedy disability
discrimination in the workplace.
This Chapter begins by arguing that the structure of Title I of the ADA (and the
ADAAA) reinforces naïve integrationism. Specifically, Title I requires that plaintiffs
prove that they are disabled but not “too disabled.” Moreover, courts have introduced
strict requirements on what constitutes a reasonable accommodation. Next, this Chapter
also argues that the ADA’s integration mandate has been successful in ending one
employment practice that has historically harmed disabled people—sheltered workshops.
Therefore, this Chapter argues that there is a tension within the ADA—while it is a tool
of naïve integrationism in its employment provisions, it transcends those limitations to
some extent through the integration mandate. Finally, this Chapter concludes by
discussing emerging policy alternatives that could mitigate some of the problems that
disabled people face in the workplace.
2. Title I of the ADA: Naïve Integrationism in the Text of the ADA
2.1 A “windfall for defendants”
The Americans with Disabilities Act’s relationship with employment outcomes
for disabled people has been fraught. The bill was hailed as “one of the most formative
pieces of American social policy legislation in the 20 th Century” (NCD 1997)—in part,
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because of its potential to increase the ability of disabled people to participate in
competitive, integrated employment. Yet, the ADA has not had these outcomes. During
the period following the passage of the ADA, the employment rate for disabled people
remained stagnant at best (Burkhauser and Stapleton 2004), with some scholars even
finding that the ADA produced worse employment outcomes for disabled persons
(Acemoglu and Angrist 2001).179 Moreover, prior to the passage of the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), plaintiffs lost Title I cases brought under the ADA
at alarming rates. One study found that plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination
under Title I of the ADA lost their cases 97 per cent of the time (Allbright 2010). A
staggering proportion of these plaintiffs failed to advance past summary judgment, a
stage at which judges can rule in favor of one party and against the other without a formal
trial (Colker 1999). According to Bagenstos (2009), before the passage of the ADAAA,
the only plaintiffs who fared worse in courts than disabled employees were prisoners,
who were frequently not represented by counsel. Most of these early losses in court were
attributed to overly-restrictive judicial interpretations of what it means to be a person
with a disability under the Act in a series of cases known in the literature as the Sutton
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Trilogy,180 as well as the Court’s subsequent ruling such as Toyota v. Williams.181 No
plaintiff who has sued over disability-related employment discrimination has ever been
successful in front of the Supreme Court (Stein et al. 2014).
After the passage of the ADAAA, in which Congress formally superseded the
Sutton Trilogy and cautioned against overly-restrictive interpretations of what it means to
be a person with a disability, preliminary data suggests that more plaintiffs are surviving
summary judgment. More courts are also ruling on the second element of a prima facie
case under the ADA—whether the plaintiff is qualified to do their job (Befort 2013). 182
However, now, plaintiffs are struggling to prove the second prong of a prima facie case—
in a stroke of irony, courts are now finding that disabled plaintiffs are not qualified to
perform their essential job functions (Befort 2013). 183 This is because the ADAAA does
not alter the fundamental structural features of the ADA. That said, studies on the
ADAAA’s effects are much more limited than initial studies on the ADA, in part,
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because the ADAAA does not apply retroactively, and litigation has been slowly making
its way through the federal court system.
The Act has been called a “windfall for defendants” (Colker 1999). This Chapter
argues that despite the best efforts of activists, Congress and the federal courts both have
interpreted the ADA from a lens that reinforces naïve integrationism. Both presumed that
a simple piece of anti-discrimination legislation would be suitable to stop the structural
inequalities that disabled people face in the workforce, not acknowledging that the
problems are much more profound.
2.1 The Sutton Trilogy, Williams, and Judicial Backlash
Conventional wisdom suggests that Sutton is where ADA employment litigation
started to “go wrong,” so to speak (See Burgdorf 1997, Mayerson 1997, Diller 2000).
Even scholars who do not think the judiciary was necessarily hostile to the ADA attribute
early litigation losses for Title I plaintiffs to the precedent set by Sutton and Williams
(See Bagenstos 2009). Before this holding, the disability community had a win in the
Supreme Court regarding the definition of disability in Bragdon v. Abbott,184 where the
Court held that asymptomatic HIV constituted a disability. However, Sutton and Williams
raised the threshold for proving the disability prong of the ADA. Therefore, this section
will begin by discussing the early precedent set by these cases. Because these cases have
subsequently been superseded by the ADAAA, I will not spend a significant amount of
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time discussing them—I rather use them to provide a backdrop against which to argue
that Title I of both the ADA and ADAAA reinforce naïve integrationism.
The complaint in Sutton was brought by two twin sisters who had severe myopia
(otherwise known as nearsightedness). The petitioners’ uncorrected vision was either
20/200 or 20/400, depending on which eye was measured. Therefore, without corrective
lenses, the sisters could not conduct many “major life activities” as prescribed by the
ADA. However, the sisters both wore glasses to correct their vision to 20/20 that allowed
them to “function identically to individuals without a similar impairment.” 185 In 1992, the
sisters applied to be commercial airline pilots at United Airlines. Both sisters met the
requirements regarding age, education, and experience, and both were invited to
interview with the company. However, during their interviews, they were both told that
the airline had made a mistake—the sisters did not meet United Airlines’ minimum
vision requirement, which required 20/100 or better vision, uncorrected. United Airlines
did not offer either of them a position.
Both sisters sued. They alleged United Airlines discriminated against them either:
(1) based on their disability, or (2) because United Airlines regarded them as having a
disability, both of which they alleged violate the ADA.186 Their suit alleged that the first
element of a prima facie case under the ADA—whether the plaintiff has a disability—
should be determined without regard to corrective measures. The EEOC “Interpretive
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Guidance” at the time maintained that corrective measures were irrelevant to determining
disability status.187 However, United Airlines argued that an impairment is not a
substantial limitation on a major life activity if it has been corrected. 188
The Supreme Court held that because the sisters were not “substantially limited”
in any major life activities (because their vision was corrected), they were not disabled
under the ADA.189 Notably, the activity of work required an unusually high threshold of
impairment per the Sutton Court. To claim that a plaintiff is “substantially limited” in
performing the major life activity of “working,” the Sutton Court reasoned that a person
must be substantially restricted in their ability to perform a “class of jobs” or a “broad
range of jobs in various classes.”190 The inability to perform a singular job was not a
substantial limitation on the major life activity of working, according to the Sutton Court.
Therefore, the sisters’ disqualification as pilots did not constitute a “substantial
limitation” on the “major life activity” of “working.”
In a concurring opinion, Ruth Bader Ginsburg reasoned that the ADA was not
intended to encompass such a wide variety of individuals. She suggested that
[P]ersons whose uncorrected eyesight is poor, or who rely on daily medication for
their well-being, can be found in every social and economic class; they do not
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cluster among the politically powerless, nor do they coalesce as historical victims
of discrimination.191
This reasoning reinforced the Court’s underlying logic—that the ADA protected people
who met some arbitrary threshold rendering them “disabled enough.” However, as many
scholars and advocacy organizations noted, this heightened threshold created a catch-22
for disabled plaintiffs—the evidence that plaintiffs needed to provide to prove that they
were disabled could be used to show they were not qualified to do their jobs (NCD 2004).
A few years later in Toyota v. Williams,192 the Court maintained the need to create
a stringent legal test or “demanding standard” to determine who was disabled under the
ADA. Williams had carpal tunnel syndrome, which affected her ability to work; however,
the Court was hesitant to hold that “performing manual tasks” was to be considered a
“major life activity.”193 Manual tasks, Justice O’Connor reasoned, did not restrict
Williams from “performing tasks that are of central importance to most people’s daily
lives.”194 An impairment, the Court reasoned, was necessary but not sufficient to prove
that someone was disabled under the ADA—the impairment must “substantially limit” a
“major life activity.” Williams’ carpal tunnel only prevented her from performing a
subset of manual tasks, and therefore did not substantially limit her in performing major
life activities. The Court pointed out that the Court of Appeals, in its decision,
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disregarded whether Williams could tend to her personal hygiene, perform household
chores, bathe, and brush her teeth—all manual tasks that are actually (according to the
Court) centrally important to people’s daily lives.195 The Court reiterated the central logic
of Sutton—that the ADA entitles a person to a job, not necessarily the role of their
choice. Unless a person was limited in completing a broad range of tasks necessary for a
broad range of professions, they were not considered disabled under early ADA
jurisprudence.
Activists, advocates, legal scholars, and even members of Congress196 were taken
aback by the Supreme Court’s rulings in these cases. 197 They took action to protect future
plaintiffs in the form of the ADAAA. However, some of the implications of these early
cases included:
⎯ A person whose disability was mitigated or controlled (e.g. by medication) was
not considered disabled under the ADA.
⎯ Work was not considered by courts to be a major life activity unless the plaintiff
was prevented from performing a broad class of job-related tasks. Therefore,
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proving that a plaintiff was unable to work a particular job did not by itself
establish a prima facie disability claim.
⎯ The evidence that plaintiffs used to establish that they were disabled was often
strong enough for employers to use that same evidence to suggest the plaintiff
was unqualified to perform the essential functions of their job.
To date, no disabled person has ever been successful in bringing an employment
discrimination claim argued before the Supreme Court since Sutton, despite the Court
hearing six such cases (Stein 2014). This low win rate can be attributed to the Court’s
holdings in Sutton and Williams.
There are two general explanations given for the decisions in Sutton and Williams.
One explanation is that the Court was lashing back against the dramatic expansion of
civil rights brought on by the ADA (See e.g. Burgdorf 1997, Mayerson 1997, Diller
2000). Another is that tensions within the disability rights movement brought about a bill
that treated disability as a protected class, allowing the courts to create high thresholds
for class membership (See Bagenstos 2009). I reject the latter of these arguments, as well
as the former to some degree. As I will argue in Subsection 2.3, the language of the Title
I itself is primarily to blame. This language is not in any way the fault of disability
activists; it was a path-dependent vestige of the wording in Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973—language that made it into the bill with no debate and no
legislative history. Indeed, no one knows who wrote this part of the legislation or why
(Shapiro 1993; Fleischer and Zames 2001). The courts were certainly hostile to the ADA;
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however, without the path-dependency of the statutory language surrounding disability,
judges might not have been able to limit the ADA’s scope as much as they did.
Before proceeding to the structural problems in Title I, however, it is necessary to
discuss the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 and how it replicates the fundamental issues
with Title I.
2.2 “Fixing” the ADA: The Structure of the ADAAA
In 2004, the National Council on Disability (NCD), a group of presidentially
appointed movement advocates, released a policy briefing condemning Sutton and similar
cases. This brief suggested that Courts had ignored existing case law on the
Rehabilitation Act, undermined congressional intent, and interpreted the ADA in narrow
and broadly incoherent ways. The report talked about the ‘Catch-22’ in which disabled
plaintiffs found themselves:
[E]ither your condition is not serious enough to constitute a disability or it is too
serious for you to be qualified. The end result is that it is a rare plaintiff who is in
a position to challenge even the most egregious and outrageous discrimination
involving a condition that can be mitigated.
As a result, the NCD included a draft bill in the publication, proposed to Congress as the
ADA Restoration Act of 2007 (ADARA). The bill’s language controversially eliminated
‘substantial limitation[s] of one or more major life activities’ from the definition of
disability, defining disability instead in terms of having an impairment or a record of an
impairment. It also prohibited courts from using mitigating measures as a justification for
denying a person coverage under the ADA. Congress quickly abandoned the ADARA

130
due to a massive outcry from the business community and conservative think-tanks such
as the Heritage Foundation. These groups thought the more expansive conception of
disability might enact undue hardships on employers and “weaken the at-will
employment doctrine that makes the American labor market so strong.” 198 Instead,
Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) that does not structurally
alter the definition of disability contained in the ADA. Rather, it clarifies legislative
intent, suggesting that cases should focus more on whether a person has been
discriminated against on the basis of a disability rather than the question of whether a
person has a disability. It includes guidance that vastly expands upon the idea of
‘substantially limiting’ and ‘regarded as,’ as well as suggesting that mitigating measures
should not be regarded as a reason that people should not receive ADA protections.
The ADAAA changes the definition of disability under the ADA in a few
important ways. First, limitations do not need to be severe or significant for an
impairment to “substantially limit” a “major life activity.” The Act expanded the
definition of “major life activities” to include performing tasks such as manual tasks,
walking, seeing, thinking, concentrating, bending, and communicating. 199 The ADAAA
also expanded the definition of “major life activities” to include “the operation of major
bodily functions.” For example, immuno-compromised individuals are now automatically
included, as are people with neurological and mental health conditions. Moreover, an

See the Heritage Foundation’s (2008) publication “The ADA Restoration Act:
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episodic impairment, such as epilepsy would be substantially limiting. Finally, only one
major life activity needs to be substantially limited for a person to qualify for protection
under the ADAAA.200 The ADAAA also strengthens the “regarded as” prong of the
ADA, which prohibits employers from discriminating against people who have an actual
or perceived impairment.201
In these ways, the ADAAA provides an essential corrective and clarification of
the legislative intent underlying the ADA. That said, it still leaves room for courts to ask
questions about whether a person is disabled, depending on when they filed their claim,
because it does not apply retroactively. Empirical studies suggest that courts are now
choosing to include more people within the category of ‘disabled persons.’ However,
these analyses are necessarily tentative and preliminary. The ADAAA does not
retroactively grant expanded coverage to people who filed ADA claims before it went
into effect. Therefore, litigation is just now making its way through the federal appellate
system.
More problematically, the ADAAA did not address questions of qualification,
meaning that it does not solve the problems traditionally faced by employees with
intellectual, developmental, psycho-social, and psychiatric disabilities. These employees,
even under the ADA as enacted, lost their cases because courts deemed them
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“unqualified” for their positions—they typically did not face the same problems showing
that they were disabled. Because courts have so restrictively interpreted what it means to
be a ‘qualified’ person with a disability, plaintiffs with such disabilities can still be
expected to fare poorly in court, despite the attempts of the ADAAA to even the playing
field for persons with disabilities. Indeed, before the passage of the ADAAA, two-thirds
of mentally ill employees were found to be unqualified for their positions, instead of
being found to be non-disabled (Hensel and Jones 2006). Courts have frequently not held
mental qualifications to the same scrutiny as physical requirements for positions.
Furthermore, changes to mental qualifications are often said to fundamentally alter the
structure of the position in question, thereby circumventing requirements for reasonable
accommodations in many cases. For example, job descriptions are often challenged on
the basis that they require an employee to lift 20 pounds. In contrast, judges have been
traditionally hesitant to make changes to job structures that might accommodate
employees with psychiatric disabilities, such as reduced hours or a less stressful work
environment. For example, Tomlinson v. Wiggins202 specifically held that there is no
guarantee under the ADA203 to a stress-free work environment, although reduced stress
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levels allow employees with psychiatric disabilities to fulfill their job obligations to a
higher caliber than they might be able to otherwise.
Therefore, it is predictable that many plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities will be
viewed as not disabled enough to trigger ADA protections or too disabled to receive
protection under Title I. This is due to ‘underqualification.’ Therefore, the ADA, even as
modified by the ADAAA, provides fewer protections for disabled employees than
comparable equalities provisions in other countries. 204
2.3 Naïve Integrationism and Title I of the ADA
As noted in Subsection 2.1, scholars have generally attributed the failure of
plaintiffs in Title I litigation to either judicial backlash or tensions within the disability
rights movement. It is my contention, however, that Title I of the ADA has been drafted
in such a way that a naïve integrationist interpretation of the ADA’s employment
provisions is virtually inevitable. This was due in large part to the somewhat random
drafting of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, rather than conscious choices on the
part of movement elites, as suggested by Bagenstos (2009). Hostile courts certainly
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played a role; however, without restrictive statutory language, they would not have been
able to damage the disability rights movement to the extent that they did.
The ADA, it is important to remember, was drafted by a council full of Reagan
appointees (Shapiro 1993, 9). Nonetheless, the members of what would become the
National Council on Disability drafted a sweeping civil rights bill. The definition of
disability discrimination included in the original draft of the ADA was radical. It
provided that:
Discrimination on the basis of handicap should be broadly construed to apply the
requirements of the statute to all situations in which a person is subjected to
unfair or unnecessary exclusion or disadvantage because of some mental or
physical impairment, perceived impairment, or history of impairment… The
nondiscrimination requirement should expressly include a duty to make
reasonable accommodations, which should be defined as providing or modifying
devices, services, or facilities, or changing practices or procedures in order to
allow a particular person to participate in a particular program, activity, or job…
In addition, there should be a requirement of eliminating discriminatory
qualifications standards, selection criteria, and eligibility requirements, with a
delineation of the standards and legal tests to be used to determine when such
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qualifications, criteria, and requirements constitute discrimination (NCD 1986,
italics added).
Justin Dart, one of the drafters, noted that the original bill was considered far too
ambitious by both Bush and Reagan. Dart remembers:
We sent it over to the White House, and very shortly we got a call from somebody
over there… And he said… ‘we have your draft of your policy Toward
Independence and I have got halfway through the first chapter.’… And he said,
“What in the world are you people thinking about up there? The President is not
going to touch this with a ten-foot pole. This goes even farther than Kennedy”
(Justin Dart qtd. in Pelka 2012, 432).
Because this interpretation of disability discrimination was considered too radical for the
current political climate, the definition of disability that made it into the ADA as passed
borrows heavily from the statutory language of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
Section 504 defines disability as a “substantial limitation” of a “major life activity.”
However, this was primarily a question of political necessity.
Movement activists, as well as sympathetic senators, decided to adopt the Section
504 definition of disability as a “substantial limitation” of a “major life activity.” It is
important to note that although it had tangible consequences for disability rights and
litigation, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 passed with no congressional
debate. Indeed, no one knows who initially drafted the legislative language or why
(Shapiro 1993; Fleischer and Zames 2001). Because Section 504 formed the basis for
disability being regarded as a civil right, it was adopted by the drafters of the ADA. It
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was much easier to argue for merely extending Section 504 to cover the private sector in
addition to the federal government than to draft an entirely different civil rights bill (NCD
1997).
This decision was not uncontroversial. Indeed, when the ADA was initially
introduced, it sparked substantial disputes among disability activists. Senate staff
members were “grilled for hours” by disabled persons who objected to the weaker
version of the bill. Activist Bonnie O’Day remembers, “lots of people felt let down” (qtd.
in NCD 1997). However, the disability rights community ultimately formed a coalition
around the bill for fear that a competing Republican bill might effectively gut the ADA.
Naïve integrationism was therefore baked into the ADA because of the random
decision of a Congressional staffer in the 1970s, about which there is no record or debate.
This language and employment provisions of the ADA more generally perpetuate naïve
integrationism in a few ways.
First, the requirement that employees be “qualified” for their positions creates a
legal loophole frequently exploited by employers. Courts’ treatment of workers with
psychiatric disabilities demonstrates this point. While psychiatrically disabled workers
have generally been regarded as disabled by courts, they have always faced problems
proving that they are qualified for their jobs (See Befort 2013). Two thirds of
psychiatrically disabled employees were found unqualified for their positions prior to the
passage of the ADA (Hensel and Jones 2006). Courts do not hold mental qualifications to
the same level of scrutiny as physical requirements. Changes to mental qualifications are
often considered fundamental alterations to the structure of the position—exempting
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employers from providing accommodations. The courts’ insistence that no right to a
stress-free work environment exists is one example of this.205
One egregious abuse of the qualification provision in the ADA is the Fourth
Circuit’s holding in Darcangelo v. Verizon Md. Inc.206 Fran Darcangelo, a plaintiff with
bipolar disorder, was terminated due to her disability. She worked for Verizon for over 20
years and had previously received accommodations, including time off to attend doctor’s
appointments. Verizon abruptly discontinued these accommodations despite their
acknowledgements of her ‘special condition.’ She was furthermore targeted for
disciplinary action at this point. Verizon alleged “concerns” with Darcangelo’s work
performance; however, all of the reported incidents had occurred more than four years
prior to her disciplinary action. Darcangelo was terminated.
The Fourth Circuit, ironically citing evidence from Darcangelo’s own
psychiatrist, granted summary judgment to her employer on the basis that bipolar
disorder had the potential to impair Darcangelo’s judgment, an “essential qualification”
for her job.207 Darcangelo had no complaints for four years prior to disciplinary action,
and it was unclear that her judgment was presently impaired. She also had generally
positive performance reviews. Nonetheless, because it was possible that her judgment
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might be impaired by her disorder, she was not considered an “otherwise qualified
individual with a disability.”208
This case is significant because of its underlying logic. First, disabled employees
are held to higher scrutiny with regard to their “judgment,” despite lapses in judgement
being in no way unique to people with bipolar disorder. Second, since “judgment” is
ostensibly an essential qualification for any job, ranging from customer service to
professional sports, the logic of this court decision would exempt any person with bipolar
disorder from coverage under the ADA. The idea of an “otherwise qualified” disabled
person therefore has been weaponized by the courts and, as a result, exacerbated naïve
integrationism.
The other concept embedded in Title I that perpetuates naïve integrationism is the
principle that accommodations need not be provided if they constitute an “undue
hardship” or “fundamental alteration” to the job in question. Courts have generally not
required employers to provide reasonable accommodations when they would either
fundamentally alter a program or cause an undue hardship to the employer—leading
courts to hold that many accommodations needed by employees with psychiatric
disabilities are unreasonable. Tomlinson v. Wiggins,209 cited earlier, held that an
employee requesting a less harsh management style from their boss was not a reasonable
accommodation. The court reasoned that employees are not entitled to stress-free work
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environments, or apparently even abuse-free ones.210 Likewise, Whalen v. City of
Syracuse211 held that a plaintiff who asked not to contact certain colleagues who triggered
their depression and anxiety was asking for an unreasonable accommodation.
Schwarzkopf v. Brunswick Corp. 212 held that it was unreasonable for a psychiatrically
disabled employee to request that he not be yelled at by his boss or colleagues. “Getting
along with people” is viewed by many courts as an “essential feature” of virtually any
job, and all of these functions are viewed to fall under the auspices of getting along with
other people. Prichard v. Dominguez 213 for this reason notes an “overwhelming
unanimity” of court opinions suggesting that it is unreasonable to transfer employees
away from triggering, hostile, or otherwise undesirable bosses under the ADA.
Courts have likewise been hesitant to require other structural changes to work
environments that might alleviate stress or triggers for employees with mental health
conditions. For example, Treanor v. MCI Telecomms. Corp.214 held that the ADA did not
require employers to create part-time positions for employees suffering from depression,
as did Lamb v. Qualex.215 Courts likewise do not routinely require smaller modifications
to employees’ schedules or hours to accommodate their illnesses. Dorgan v. Suffolk
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Community College,216 for example, held that employers are not required to
accommodate employees by modifying their schedules. The employee in question had
bipolar disorder, which made it difficult for her to attend work during designated work
hours. Employers are also not required to accommodate requests to work from home,
even when the position would allow for it.
These cases suggest a fundamental hostility toward restructuring the workplace in
ways that support workers with psychiatric disabilities. As opposed to a social
understanding of disability, which puts the onus on employers to create an
accommodating environment, courts have held that the responsibility for managing
mental illness in the workplace falls solely upon employees. In the first instance, there is
a difference between asking for a ‘stress-free’ work environment and an environment that
minimizes potential triggers that might inhibit a mentally ill employee’s job performance.
The idea that ‘getting along with people’ requires a disabled employee to tolerate a
hostile work environment that undermines their mental well-being, but it does not impose
reciprocal obligations on the part of managers to ensure that work environments are not
hostile, seems to unfairly shift the onus of ‘getting along with people’ onto disabled
employees without requiring employers to live up to similar standards. It is true that
‘getting along with people’ is an important part of many jobs; however, courts have
defined ‘getting along with people’ in such a way that a disabled person who cannot cope

216

No. 12-CV-0330 (SJF)(ARL), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107850 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4,
2014)

141
with hostile work environments without their mental health suffering is at fault, while
managers who create hostile work environments are not held to the same standards.
By nominally protecting individuals from discrimination on the basis of disability
while simultaneously holding that people cannot display any symptoms of their disability
in the performance of their jobs, the court system reinforces naïve integrationism.
However, this is not entirely due to judicial hostility—the language of Title I itself
requires that a person be “otherwise qualified,” that their accommodations be
“reasonable” and that they not “fundamentally alter” the workplace in any way. In this
way, Title I can claim to protect disabled workers against discrimination while
simultaneously denying such protection to most disabled people. For this reason, many
prominent activist groups have shifted attention away from employment discrimination
cases and toward Olmstead litigation.217
3. Innovative Uses of the Integration Mandate: A Way Forward
Title I of the ADA, for the reasons discussed above, does not seem to be a fruitful
way to improve the integration of disabled people into competitive, integrated
employment. However, activists’ attempts to end the segregation of disabled people into
sheltered workshops have recently garnered attention. Notably, the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon recently certified a class in Lane v. Kitzhaber 218 (now
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Lane v. Brown) of “all individuals in Oregon with intellectual or developmental
disabilities who are in, or have been referred to, sheltered workshops” and “who are
qualified for supported employment services.”219 The complaint in this matter relied on
the holding in Olmstead that disabled people should not be unnecessarily segregated and
was joined by the United States Department of Justice’s Disability Rights Division. 220
The suit was brought by eight individuals and United Cerebral Palsy of Oregon
and Southwest Washington and sought injunctive relief under Title II of the ADA (the
integration mandate). Specifically, Title II of the ADA prohibits public entities from
discriminating against disabled persons. Unnecessary segregation, per Olmstead,
constitutes discrimination by public entities. The regulations for Title II provide that the
“most integrated setting appropriate” is “a setting that enables individuals with
disabilities to interact with nondisabled persons to the fullest extent possible.” 221 The
plaintiffs alleged that the state of Oregon violated Title II of the ADA by referring
individuals in the state vocational rehabilitation system directly to sheltered workshops.
Specifically, the Oregon Department of Human Services violated Title II of the ADA by
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giving significantly more money to sheltered workshops than supported employment
programs.222 After closing the last institution for developmentally and intellectually
disabled people in 2009, Oregon increased reliance on sheltered workshops and
decreased the use of supported employment services. 223 The District Court held that the
class met the requirements for certification and had stated a valid claim upon which relief
could be granted. In other words, the class fulfilled the requirements to move on in
litigation. However, the matter was settled before it was litigated further. 224 Nonetheless,
the certification of this class was a first and has been cited in seven similar class
certification decisions at the time of writing. 225
The settlement agreement prioritized the creation and implementation of
supported employment services for intellectually and developmentally disabled people in
Oregon. As part of the agreement, Oregon agreed to reduce the number of individuals in
sheltered workshops by nearly 50 per cent by June 30, 2022.226 Individuals will instead
receive supported employment services based upon their “capabilities, choices, and
strengths.”227 Through this settlement agreement, at least 4,900 people between the ages
of 14 and 24 will receive employment services through the state, and at least half will
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receive an individualized employment plan that will enable them to participate in
competitive, integrated employment. 228 The goal will be for these people to work in an
integrated setting for at least 20 hours per week. 229 Moreover, local educational agencies
may not refer students to sheltered workshops, and activities at school will no longer be
allowed to mimic sheltered workshops. Finally, the state of Oregon will give grants to
existing sheltered workshop providers to expand their supported employment
programs.230 This settlement agreement will be enforced by monitoring by the state, as
well as Disability Rights Oregon and the United States Department of Justice.
This case demonstrates the power of the Olmstead integration mandate to create
supported integration rather than naïve integrationism. Instead of merely closing
sheltered workshops, this settlement agreement provides for services necessary for
disabled people to participate in competitive, integrated employment. Moreover, because
the District Court certified the class before the settlement agreement was reached, such
precedent can be used as persuasive authority in other states where activists are pursuing
similar litigation.
It is worth noting that the ADA does not explicitly ban sheltered workshops—
indeed, it explicitly allows them to continue functioning (See Stefan 2010). This suggests
a potential limitation of litigation as a strategy for producing Olmstead compliance.
However, the overuse of sheltered workshops for people who could participate in
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competitive, integrated employment undermines the integration mandate of Olmstead. 231
The ADA is therefore a double-edged sword for activists seeking to enhance employment
rights for disabled people. On one hand, it can be an effective tool for deconstructing
work silos and role segregation that have separated disabled people from their peers. This
increases participatory parity by ensuring that disabled people can control the conditions
under which they work, as well as earning at least the minimum wage (which is far from
guaranteed in the status quo). However, Title I of the ADA, which explicitly focuses on
employment, undermines participatory parity by failing to give adequate remedies to
workers who have been discriminated against.
Because of the deficiencies of the ADA regarding employment, much of this
change must happen at the systemic policy level. The work needed is not dissimilar to the
alternatives to deinstitutionalization discussed in Chapter 2. States must initiate and
implement supported employment programs. In the section that follows, I will set out
some of the potential benefits of supported employment programs for disabled
employees.
4. Policies that Support the Spirit of Olmstead
As established in the previous sections, employment-based litigation is not as
promising as other court-based avenues for pursuing policy change. Therefore, it is
important to address the policy context in which systemic change needs to happen.
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Overcoming naïve integrationism will not be accomplished through the courts alone. This
section discusses some promising policy avenues for increasing competitive, integrated
employment for disabled people.
4.1 The Role of State Vocational Rehabilitation Programs
Each state is federally required and funded to offer vocational rehabilitation
services through a designated vocational rehabilitation agency—every state has one or
two such agencies. In 2010, more than 1.4 million disabled individuals received services
from vocational rehabilitation agencies (See Hyde, Honeycutt, and Stapleton 2014). Title
I of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 approves grants to states for vocational rehabilitation
services, supported employment, independent living, and client assistance programs.
Under Title I of the Rehabilitation Act, disabled people can receive services to help them
pursue post-secondary education, employment, or other ways to live independently in the
community. Services provided by vocational rehabilitation agencies differ between states
but generally include services such as career counseling, medical services, training for
jobs, and medical equipment that would enable people to pursue employment. 232 One
study found a causal relationship between the availability of vocational rehabilitation
services and applications for disability benefits. This study suggested that disabled
individuals were more likely to apply for and to seek disability benefits in months that
state agencies served a lower percentage of applicants or had a shorter waiting period
before people received services (Hyde, Honeycutt, and Stapleton 2014). Other studies
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have shown that increased vocational rehabilitation services can help people find and stay
in competitive, integrated employment, because these services provide people with the
supports they need to work effectively (See e.g. Chan et al. 2016). These findings suggest
that vocational rehabilitation services can play a vital role in helping people find and
maintain competitive, integrated employment.
How do vocational rehabilitation services do this? This section discusses the role
of vocational rehabilitation services in allowing people to obtain and maintain
employment, as well as discussing some innovative moves by state vocational
rehabilitation agencies that have increased competitive, integrated employment among
disabled people.
The goal of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as amended by the Workforce
Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA)233 is “competitive, integrated employment,”
defined as work that is performed on a full or part-time basis for which an individual is
compensated at or above the minimum wage and is not less than the customary rate paid
by the employer for similar work. This work must also be performed at a location in the
community where disabled employees interact with other non-disabled employees. The
work must also present appropriate opportunities for advancement. WIOA allows for
“customized employment” for people with “significant disabilities” that tailor
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individualized support programs for those individuals. WIOA also creates opportunities
for supported employment, discussed in the next subsection. 234
Historically, the major problem with relying on state vocational rehabilitation
services is that they are chronically underfunded. Agencies deal with this funding
shortfall in different ways—some agencies serve fewer people more intensively, and
others serve more people but provide less intensive services (See Hyde, Honeycutt, and
Stapleton 2014). Generally, vocational rehabilitation programs have an “order of
selection” process that prioritizes significantly disabled individuals over others (BenShalom 2016). That said, WIOA amended the Rehabilitation Act to provide more funding
for state vocational rehabilitation agencies and to expand the populations that such
agencies can serve (See Ben-Shalom 2016). As a result, vocational rehabilitation agencies
in light of WIOA might be a promising place to begin increasing integrated, competitive
employment for workers with disabilities.
Rehabilitation programs do vary by state, but WIOA has increased many states’
capacities to serve populations that they have not historically served. For example, WIOA
increased services for transition-age youth, workers who receive subminimum wages, as
well as workers already in employment who are seeking to stay employed (Mann and
Croake 2017). Mann and Croake (2017) found that after the passage of WIOA, half of
applicants to state vocational rehabilitation services who were neither students nor paid
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workers beforehand were employed after receiving vocational rehabilitation services,
controlling for differences between state service provision. Three-quarters of people who
were already employed were able to maintain their employment due to the more intensive
service provision.
Vocational rehabilitation programs, especially in the wake of WIOA, have the
potential to overcome some of the worst effects of naïve integrationism. Naïve
integrationism would push for the closure of sheltered workshops and the end of
subminimum wage positions without having a clear plan for what to do with these
workers after they leave these settings. However, the amount of individualized support
provided by state agencies in the wake of WIOA means that people leaving subminimum
wage situations, even those who are severely disabled, qualify for intensive, personalized
employment services that have already shown promise in improving employment
outcomes. The next subsection will discuss one of the specific services vocational
rehabilitation agencies can provide and the growing evidence base behind it.
4.2 Supported Employment
Workplace supports are important for disabled workers generally but are
particularly important for psychiatrically, cognitively, intellectually, or psycho-socially
disabled workers. For example, only one in five adults with schizophrenia work in
competitive employment settings, and less than half are employed in any capacity (Chow
2014, 1126). Moreover, 61-85 per cent of working-age adults with psychiatric disabilities
are not in the labor force, compared to 20 per cent of adults in the general population
(Chow 2014, 1126). As a result, psychiatrically disabled individuals are more likely to
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experience poverty (and poverty is likely to trigger psychiatric symptoms).235 Therefore,
there has been a concerted effort in the disability policy literature to develop tools that
allow such individuals to pursue competitive, integrated employment. One promising tool
discussed and favored by the literature is supported employment.
Supported employment provides individualized supports to disabled people in
competitive, integrated settings, earning competitive wages (See Stefan 2012). Although
supported employment can take many forms, generally, supported employment services
help disabled people identify, acquire, and maintain competitive, integrated employment.
Generally, state vocational rehabilitation agencies work with employers directly to
provide on-the-job support for disabled people, thus allowing disabled people to bypass
sheltered workshops and volunteer experiences and enter the workforce directly. 236 As
opposed to traditional vocational rehabilitation models in which only 21 per cent of
people receiving services find competitive jobs, 58 per cent of people receiving supported
employment services find and maintain competitive, integrated employment in their
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communities.237 This is because supported employment provides coaching and support to
people in real-time to complete their positions to the best of their abilities.
The driving rationale behind supported employment is that: (1) mental health
consumers enjoy competitive integrated employment more than sheltered workshops, (2)
competitive jobs reduce the stigma attached to mental illness, and (3) competitive,
integrated employment promotes self-sufficiency and independence on the part of
disabled people.238 Moreover, mental health consumers who work are more likely to
report fewer symptoms and a higher quality of life than mental health consumers who do
not work.239 Therefore, the provision of supports to stay in the workplace, such as
employment specialists, job coaches and other resources, can help people live
independently in their communities and participate on an equal basis with their nondisabled peers.240 These supports ought to and can be provided through state vocational
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rehabilitation programs—if funding were diverted from segregated programs to
integrated programs, this would be possible to achieve.
What services does supported employment provide, and how does it achieve
results for disabled workers? Generally, individualized placement and support is viewed
as the most successful model of supported employment for psychiatrically disabled
employees. Individualized placement and support entails supporting an individual in a
rapid job search (as opposed to lengthy assessments, training, and counseling) followed
by placement in a competitive employment setting. This employment is supplemented by
unlimited in-work support by an employment specialist for both the employee and the
employer.241 By supporting both the employee and the employer, individualized
placement and support allows both parties to come to an ideal consensus about the
disabled employee’s needs, capacities, and strengths, as well as allows for
troubleshooting any problems that may arise during the course of the individual’s
employment. People are not restricted from participating in individualized placement and
support based on their diagnoses, substance abuse history, symptoms, psychiatric
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hospitalizations, or involvement with the criminal justice system, to name a few
factors.242
Supported employment, especially individualized placement and support,
prevents people from being needlessly institutionalized or incarcerated by helping people
stay integrated in their communities. Competitive, integrated employment also reduces
mental health symptoms, as discussed previously. Some studies show that 60 per cent of
people receiving individualized placement and support become employed (Salkever
2010), and people tend to maintain their employment when assessed at the 10-year mark
after receiving supported employment services (Bond et al. 2008; Salyers et al. 2004).
Moreover, studies have shown that individuals receiving individualized placement and
support decrease their use of mental health services—one study found that disabled
individuals receiving individualized placement and support decreased service use by 41
per cent in one year, with reduced inpatient hospitalizations and emergency room visits as
well (Rogers et al. 1995).
Supported employment also decreases involvement with the criminal justice
system. A study conducted in Washington State found that mental health consumers
receiving supported employment were arrested less frequently than similarly situated
people not receiving it (Fan et al. 2016). Furthermore, although finding employment is
particularly difficult for people with criminal justice involvement, individuals receiving
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individualized placement and support with a history of justice involvement fare far better
in securing competitive, integrated employment than people receiving traditional
vocational rehabilitation services.243
Given the role that supported employment plays in keeping people integrated in
their communities and reducing incidence of psychiatric symptoms, litigating in favor of
supported employment services seems to be a promising avenue for unraveling the
negative effects of naïve integrationism. Supported employment programs demonstrate
that most disabled people can participate in competitive, integrated employment, if they
are given the support they need to do so effectively. Supported employment programs
also bypass the problems with reasonable accommodations, the shortfalls of which will
be discussed in the next section. In short, from both a systemic policy frame and a
litigation frame, advocating for increased supported employment services seems
necessary for achieving competitive, integrated employment for disabled people who
want it.
4.3 The Role of Civil Rights Laws
Although supported employment is a powerful tool for reducing unemployment
and poverty among disabled people, it is a necessary but insufficient tool for producing
community integration in the field of employment. There is still a role for civil rights law
in ensuring that disabled people have a fair opportunity to participate in the workplace,
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although that role has been somewhat circumscribed by courts. This is because programs
like supported employment are the prerogative of individual employers, whereas every
employer with more than 15 employees is bound by the ADA.
One of the pivotal provisions of the ADA is that employers are required to
provide the reasonable accommodations necessary for disabled workers to perform their
essential job functions. For example, one study conducted by Chow et al. (2014)
discusses the employment effects of job accommodations for workers with disabilities, as
well as their impact on workers drawing from social security disability benefits (SSI and
SSDI). Controlling for a number of factors, individuals who received job
accommodations worked nearly 8 hours more per month and worked 31 per cent longer.
Moreover, each job accommodation provided by an employer decreased the risk of the
employee being fired by nearly 13 per cent. This suggests that more robust enforcement
of the ADA does have a role to play in allowing individuals to find work and keep
competitive, integrated employment once they have it.
The main problem with this perspective is that courts have effectively gutted the
reasonable accommodation provision of the ADA. One of the first problems with the
ADA’s reasonable accommodations provision is that it requires employees to selfdisclose their disability to trigger legal protections, including the requirement to engage
in the interactive process. However, disclosing disability increases the potential for
prejudiced employers to discriminate against the disabled employee. This creates what
the literature has called a “disclosure dilemma” (See, e.g., Allen and Carlson 2003;
Peterson et al. 2011). The disclosure dilemma is particularly acute for psychiatrically
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disabled employees who more frequently face stigma when asking for accommodations
(Peterson et al. 2011).244
Title I of the ADA also exempts employers from providing reasonable
accommodations if provision of such accommodations would constitute an “undue
hardship” on the employer.245 Existing case law does not extensively discuss what
constitutes an undue hardship, but an undue hardship is generally viewed to be a
fundamental alteration to the essential job functions—something it would be difficult or
expensive for the employer to provide. 246
Both the disclosure dilemma and the undue hardship provision have allowed
employers refuse to accommodate disabled workers with impunity; however, the most
problematic feature of Title I’s reasonable accommodation provision is the way that
courts have interpreted the term “reasonable accommodation.” Although the ADA
requires an accommodation to be effective, 247 the ADA does not entitle an employee to
her chosen accommodation—only an accommodation that a court would deem to be

The disclosure dilemma is exacerbated by the law’s general dismissal of the claims
brought by psychiatrically disabled employees. Courts are hesitant to enforce the rights of
employees with psychiatric disabilities, and therefore, these employees both open
themselves up to stigma and have little means of recourse if they are discriminated
against.
245 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2020).
246 See Disability Discrimination, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
(Accessed May 20, 2020), https://www.eeoc.gov/disability-discrimination.
247 See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EEOC-CVG-2003-1,
Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (2002).
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“reasonable.”248 Specifically, “The ADA does not obligate an employer to provide a
disabled employee every accommodation on his wishlist.” 249 Despite the employer’s duty
to offer a reasonable accommodation, “an employee cannot make [the] employer provide
a specific accommodation if another reasonable accommodation is instead provided.” 250
Many accommodations requested by disabled workers, especially workers with
psychiatric disabilities, are viewed to be unreasonable. As noted earlier in this Chapter,
courts have not routinely required employers to provide reasonable accommodations for
workers with psychiatric disabilities. For example, the District Court in Tomlinson v.
Wiggins,251 cited previously, held that employees requesting less harsh management
styles from their bosses is not a reasonable accommodation. Psychiatrically disabled
employees have also been denied transfers to other managers or teams due to hostile
work environments that damage their mental health. 252
Courts have also been hesitant to require structural changes to work environments
which might alleviate triggers for employees with mental health disabilities. For example,
as noted earlier, Treanor v. MCI Telecomms. Corp.253 held that the ADA did not require
employers to create part-time positions for employees suffering from depression, as did
Lamb v. Qualex.254 Courts likewise do not generally require employers to modify

See Diaz v. City of Philadelphia, 565 F. App’x 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2014).
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schedules or hours to accommodate peoples’ illnesses.255 Generally, courts are hesitant to
require employers to fundamentally alter the workplace in any way to accommodate
psychiatric, developmental, intellectual, or psycho-social disability. This suggests that
courts’ treatment of the reasonable accommodations provision of the ADA has
fundamentally reduced its efficacy as a tool for disabled workers to negotiate their
position.
The ADAAA did not change the reasonable accommodations provision of the
ADA, only the definition of disability. Therefore, it did not yield a substantial
improvement for disabled workers seeking to litigate their claims. That said, the
reasonable accommodations prong is not completely toothless. Employers are encouraged
to engage in a good-faith, interactive process with their employees to determine what
accommodations can be reasonably provided. 256 Indeed, a failure to engage in this
process can be evidence of failure-to-accommodate.257 Therefore, disability disclosure
can trigger protections for disabled workers.
Some states have strengthened the reasonable accommodations requirement under
the ADA, therefore creating more stringent requirements than federal law. For example,
California modified its Fair Housing and Employment Act (FEHA) before Congress
passed the ADAAA. The Prudence Kay Poppink Act (PKP Act), among other provisions,
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made employers liable for refusing to or inadequately engaging in the interactive process
that determines whether and what reasonable accommodations an employee or job
applicant will receive.
Button (2018), the only major empirical study conducted on the changes to the
FEHA, concludes that these changes to the FEHA significantly increased employment
outcomes for individuals with disabilities, with an effect that was still significant at least
six years later. Button performed a difference-in-difference-in-differences regression
analysis using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to establish this effect. He
first compared Californians with disabilities, before and after the changes to the FEHA,
to persons with disabilities in other states, then compared Californians with disabilities to
Californians without disabilities over the same time period. He then proceeded to
combine the control groups to estimate a difference-in-difference-in-differences. He
estimates that the probability of a person with a disability being employed increased by
3.8 percentage points after the passage of the PKP Act. As he notes, “[t]his employment
increase is large relevant to the employment-to-population ratio for individuals with
disabilities in California before the PKP Act came into force (24.5%).”
The success of the PKP Act suggests that there is a role for stronger civil rights
laws in the equation—something disability policy experts who focus on employment
often ignore. That said, as discussed throughout this Chapter, Title I of the ADA is
fundamentally limited in its scope and application for disabled workers. Because state
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laws can provide stronger protections than federal laws, however, it is possible to remedy
some of the inadequacies of the ADA with state-level anti-discrimination laws. 258
5. Conclusion
This Chapter makes several claims about disability and employment; however,
the fundamental purpose of this Chapter is to demonstrate that litigation efforts under
Title I of the ADA represent a flawed strategy for pursuing disability justice. Instead,
meaningful changes to the employment status of disabled people need to come from
systemic policy changes accompanied by litigation under the Olmstead mandate—these
changes range from providing supported employment services to adequately funding state
Vocational Rehabilitation services so that they can support more people.
Title I of the ADA, even as amended, remains a “windfall for employers,” as
Colker (1999) claimed. Disability advocacy groups, acknowledging the shortcomings of
Title I, have turned their attention to innovative litigation under Title II of the ADA (the
Olmstead mandate), as well as systemic policy advocacy. This strategy seeks to end the
practice of filtering workers into sheltered workshops. Instead, litigation and policy
efforts are aimed at inducing states to give funds to programs like supported employment
and vocational rehabilitation services that promote competitive, integrated employment
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for disabled workers. As this chapter has argued, such strategies have been far more
effective than litigation under Title I to date.
This strategy is largely untested, however. It remains to be seen whether this is a
litigation strategy that resulted in an isolated win in Oregon or whether it can be
implemented nationwide. Nonetheless, it represents an innovative way to overcome naïve
integrationism by pushing for the services and supports disabled workers need to thrive in
the workplace.
In the final Chapter, I will discuss how disability services can work together
throughout a disabled person’s lifetime to ensure integration in housing, health,
education, and employment. I will also discuss the effects of COVID-19 on the provision
of disability services in the status quo, as well as options going forward.
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Chapter 5: Future Directions for Disability Law
1. Introduction
Previous chapters have laid a foundation for understanding the potential, as well
as the problems, with existing disability law when considering integrating people into
their communities. I argue that participatory parity requires an integration presumption
and that most disabled people can and do benefit from properly designed community
settings. However, readers may be left with many questions at this point: what would this
type of integration look like in practice? How ought we proceed? Why should we favor
integration over, for example, a form of segregation that provides robust supports? What
will be the effects of the current political and public health climates on disability rights
litigation and policy going forward? This Chapter seeks to answer some of these
questions by examining the role integration can play in facilitating social inclusion at
various points in disabled people’s lives. I then conclude by discussing some of the
upcoming legal and political challenges and opportunities posed by a deeply conservative
federal courts system and the COVID-19 global pandemic.
2. Why is segregation ableist?
As argued in Chapter 1 and further articulated in Chapter 2, presumptive
segregation works to preserve the apparatus of ableism. As noted at that time, ableism has
many meanings, but this project regards ableism as an apparatus whereby disabled people
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are placed at a disadvantage relative to able-minded, able-bodied, or neurotypical people.
As Taussig (2020) eloquently describes it:
Ableism is the process of favoring, fetishizing, and building the world around a
mostly imagined, idealized body while discriminating against those bodies
perceived to move, see, hear, process, operate, look, or need differently from that
vision (10).
Ableism encompasses both overt acts of prejudice or exclusion and also social
expectations and prejudices that render certain spaces inaccessible. The apparatus of
ableism points to a society that is not “built” for disabled people—one that presumes they
do not exist, a world from which disabled people are excluded. Taussig continues:
Ableism thunders in the background of every conversation, every story, every
building. It’s the atmosphere we breathe, a body of principles, rules we live by.
We learn its tenets like we learn about good and evil: with subtle and consistent
reinforcement (2020, 10-11).
Ableism conditions us to think certain mind-bodies are better than others—that disability
is somehow a deficit, that disabled lives are fundamentally different from and worse than
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abled lives.259 The social model of disability, popularized by disability scholars, serves to
complicate the narrative of ableism.
What if disability is not a deficit? What if society is built in such a way that it
excludes certain mind-bodies? What if the onus for rectifying the structural injustices
associated with disability should be placed on society rather than disabled individuals?
Although the social model of disability is contested and undoubtedly more complicated
than this, there is a fundamental truth to it. Our world is not built for disabled mindbodies. But what if it were? The ableist narrative that people are “better off” in
segregated spaces that are in some way chosen for them by default or others is the
narrative that this project seeks to destabilize.
As Davy (2015) notes, it is not just built environments that are inaccessible—our
very ideas, values, and philosophies can perpetuate ableist myths as well. Davy uses the
example of autonomy. We tend to think of autonomous agents as atomistic, isolated,
rational choosers—but who is excluded when we conceive of autonomy in this way? My
argument is that this premise applies when we think about social spaces as well. We tend
to think of integration as somehow synonymous with independence rather than
dependence, that certain needs cannot be met in integrated settings. But what if they can?
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What if, like autonomy, the idea that disabled people are “better off” when they are
isolated from non-disabled peers is another ableist myth?
I take the view that this myth is both ableist and actually keeps disabled people
from being able to make genuine, reasoned choices about their lives, contrary to its
professed commitments. Segregation historically perpetuated the social exclusion of
disabled people and therefore functioned as a tool of ableism. Disabled people were shut
off from society in institutions or asylums—places where they were subjected to extreme
neglect and abuse and denied the chance to live independent lives in their communities.
Disabled people were not legally entitled to a formal education until the 1960s. When
they were legally entitled to an education, schools were not held accountable for the ways
in which they educated disabled children. As a result, children like Amy Rowley who
performed “at grade level” were left behind. Even now, disabled children are frequently
siloed into separate schools, where they are not afforded the same opportunities to
participate in extracurricular activities. As they age, they are likely to be presumptively
placed in sheltered workshops or institutions by well-meaning relatives. They are more
likely to be placed in nursing homes preemptively, to be forgotten by society, to be
excluded from work. These forms of exclusion deny disabled people the chance to make
meaningful choices about their lives.
Of course, my arguments are contingent—as I noted in Chapter 1, they must be.
Justice does not exist in a vacuum—it is not some transcendent ideal or form to which we
aspire. It is a means to minimize oppression in a highly imperfect world, a world with a
particular history and set of contingencies. In this world, integration is almost certainly
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preferable to segregation, given the ways in which segregated environments are designed
and the interests that maintain them.
But even if we were to take the approach that justice should not be contingent,
presumptive integration through governmental policy is the only way to allow disabled
people to make meaningful decisions about their lives. Presumptive integration means
that governments and non-disabled people must think critically about the ways in which
our world is designed—and provide services in-place to people previously excluded from
this world. Overcoming the presumption that certain people cannot participate in our
world by creating supports that allow them to is a key component of affording these
people a choice going forward. When disabled people are able to participate in integrated
settings, they are less likely to be impoverished, more likely to develop meaningful skills,
better able to participate in our democracy, and able to have meaningful interactions with
non-disabled peers. A policy presuming integration is the only way to ensure
participatory parity. Until ableist conditions that prevent people from participating as
equals are redressed, we cannot say that disabled people have a meaningful choice about
whether to choose an integrated or segregated setting.
3. What Integrated Service Provision Looks Like
Integration is an imperative of justice, as Anderson would phrase it. Integration
allows disabled people to participate in society as equals and deconstructs the injustices
created by enforced state segregation.
It is my contention that governments have a choice—they can offer disabilityspecific services in primarily integrated settings or primarily segregated settings.
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Regardless of the environment in which these services are provided, disabled people are
going to have the same support needs—therefore, it is not immediately apparent that
providing disability-specific services in integrated environments must be more costly.
Therefore, the question becomes: in which setting are disabled people “better off”?
I argue that when the government is sanctioning and providing disability-specific
services, they ought to be provided in the most integrated setting possible. This does not
require disabled people to integrate—for example, plenty of cultural and ethnic minorities
voluntarily separate themselves yet could integrate if they choose.260 Indeed, the opposite
is true—when the government provides segregated services as a presumption, disabled
people lack the choice to pursue their lives in integrated settings because they lack the
support necessary to do so. Integration means independence for disabled people. It means
the end of role segregation. It means disabled people can control their lives and their
livelihoods. In what follows, I more closely examine what this level of control means and
what is at stake throughout the lives of disabled people.
3.1 Education
Preparing disabled people for independent, community-based lives starts during
childhood and adolescence, and the role of the government in providing community
services and supports through education starts during this time as well. Integration in
education means providing services that would traditionally be provided in segregated
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settings in the most integrated setting possible. While it is true that disabled students have
different support needs and might in some cases need separate instruction, there is no
reason that instruction cannot be provided in a school that is integrated. For example,
disabled children might need additional skills-based work, such as classes on basic life
skills; however, that does not mean that a disabled child cannot or does not benefit from
having recess and opportunities to interact with non-disabled peers.
A non-naïve form of integration would acknowledge that disabled children
frequently need intensive supports and may even need separate classrooms for certain
subjects. However, in many cases, working with a paraprofessional in an integrated
classroom might suffice to fulfill a particular child’s support needs. A non-naïve form of
integration would acknowledge that the baseline for students differs between people, just
as it does for non-disabled children. Thus, children like Amy Rowley would be entitled to
the full range of supports guaranteed by the Americans with Disabilities Act via the
Olmstead mandate and Fry decision. A supportive integration would acknowledge that
some children, such as Neill Roncker, might have specific support needs such that they
need to learn in separate classrooms. However, the goal of education would be to both
maximize students’ independence and their opportunities to interact with the world
around them.
Neill Roncker was denied this possibility altogether. His parents were given a
false choice between better educational outcomes and giving Neill an education alongside
his peers. However, this is not a decision they had to face—government funding
structures meant that a better education for Neill could be provided only in a completely
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segregated setting. There was nothing magical about that setting, but rather the levels of
support provided in that setting. Parents of disabled students and disabled students
themselves should not have to choose between the social offerings of an integrated
setting and the support opportunities afforded by separate settings.
Nor do they have to under existing law—existing law provides for an integration
presumption. This presumption is strengthened by decisions like Endrew F. and Fry that
reinforce the idea that disabled children can achieve “ambitious” goals and are entitled to
the supports provided by the ADA in educational settings. Existing law is in this way
moving beyond naïve integration through the tireless work of disability advocates and
creative cause lawyering.
2.2 Employment
Likewise, disabled people do not have to be segregated in employment settings. In
fact, most available policy research points to the idea that disabled people perform better
in competitive, integrated employment. Sheltered workshops and subminimum wage jobs
require the same level of support as integrated settings but atrophy disabled people’s
abilities and social skills rather than developing them. Thus, competitive, integrated
employment not only improves wages but also serves as a means of creating
independence for disabled workers.
Supported employment programs and state vocational rehabilitation systems, as
discussed in Chapter 4, provide vital opportunities to transcend naïve integration through
concrete policy. Per the Olmstead mandate, states are legally obligated to prefer
integrated service provision when it exists. Thus, creative lawyering and the development
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of policy alternatives can help move America past naïve integrationism by (1) showing
that disabled people can be employed in community settings, and (2) dismantling
exploitative structures that keep disabled people from being served in their communities.
2.3 Independent Living
The most fundamental component of ensuring that disabled people are able to live
fulfilling lives in their communities is ensuring that they live in integrated, independent
settings insofar as possible. Both education and employment are prerequisites to
achieving this goal.
As established in Chapter 2, disabled people can and do live fulfilling lives in
their communities—to say otherwise perpetuates ableist role stereotypes. Even people
with significant support needs can be served (and are often better served) in community
settings. For example, peer support settings and non-inpatient settings significantly
reduce the need for psychiatric interventions. Likewise, maintaining scattered-site,
supported housing programs allows people’s needs to be met while at the same time
ensuring that they are free from coercive institutional environments.
One might ask whether institutions are necessary for some disabled people—that
kinder institutions are possible, that living in communities with other disabled people can
be better for people with high support needs. One such example is Eva Feder Kittay’s
daughter Sesha, who lives in a group home. This group home is far from the institutions
described by Dybwad—it is an environment in which she is arguably thriving.
First, it is important to acknowledge that the circumstances under which disabled
people could not live by themselves are exceedingly rare, as evidenced by the number of
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people with even severe cognitive disabilities currently living and thriving in communitybased settings.261 However, even when someone needs more intensive support, it is
wrong to presumptively segregate them. It is far more likely that disabled people will be
arbitrarily stripped of their autonomy based on other people’s expectations of them.
Nonetheless, I acknowledge that some people will need constant and much more support
than most disabled people. In these cases, I think it is important to think about how to
maximize independence and integration to prevent creating the self-fulfilling prophesy
referenced previously. It is not clear, for example, that more community-based, supported
housing with a live-in caretaker is an unfeasible option for someone like Sesha. Indeed,
many former Pennhurst residents with similar disabilities lived and thrived in supported
housing programs in Philadelphia (Downey and Conroy 2020).
Moreover, I think that questions like this reveal a lack of imagination. Even
Kittay’s own language about her daughter emphasizes the burden imposed on carers—
“[w]hen unaccompanied by support, efforts on the part of the disability community to
allow disabled children and adults to remain in their community mean that the care falls
squarely and exclusively on the shoulders of (usually female) family members” (2013,
69). Instead of focusing on how and why the world is not built for Sesha, Kittay presumes
that Sesha’s needs are in some sense exceptional, that they could not be met by the world
in which we live. That might be true—the world in which we live is frankly not designed
to accommodate people with Sesha’s support needs. However, my point here is that the
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way our world is designed is itself contingent, that through imagination, we can envisage
a future that moves past ableist narratives about whether people “can” or “cannot” live in
certain settings. Asking whether Sesha can live in her community is in this sense the
wrong question to ask—the right question is why the community is not designed to
facilitate Sesha’s support needs? In this way, even the “hard cases” posed by those
skeptical of community integration do not undermine the ideal of integration as a critical
component of disability justice. Integration is not any less important to justice for
Sesha—but we may have a long way to go before the community is ready to integrate
Sesha to the extent that she deserves.
4. Future Directions for Disability Law
I would be remiss if in a chapter discussing the future directions of disability law,
I did not address the increasingly complicated world in which we live. Amy Coney
Barrett and Brett Kavanaugh have recently been confirmed to the Supreme Court,
reinforcing a wave of conservativism in American judicial politics. Moreover, we are
living through a global pandemic that has killed over 530,000 Americans at the time of
writing. Both of these phenomena are likely to affect the course of disability law in
unpredictable directions.
For instance, to say that Amy Coney Barrett is not an advocate for disability
rights might be an understatement. At least 50 disability advocacy groups opposed her
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nomination.262 Disability advocates expressed concerns about her record on the bench,
including her position on the Affordable Care Act, which ensures that disabled
Americans cannot be discriminated against in health insurance provision. Moreover,
Barrett’s record on disability education has been mixed—she suggested in one case that
disabled students may be excluded from integrated schools during open enrollment
because of their support needs. Nonetheless, from personal experience, advocacy groups
tend to see disability rights as one of the safest areas for litigation in an increasingly
conservative federal court system. Disability is an issue that is simultaneously highly
political and depoliticized by most Republicans.
Another issue complicating the future of disability law is the COVID-19
pandemic. The potential implications of the pandemic could occupy an entire project
itself. However, for the purposes of this section, I will merely lay out some of the ways in
which it might change the disability rights landscape. On one hand, the rise of distance
education ushered in by COVID-19 is an accommodation that has been requested by
disabled students for years; however, there are fears that the IDEA’s educational
requirements will be undermined as teachers are ill-equipped to transition to distance
learning.263 Likewise, the transition to remote work poses both opportunities and
challenges for disabled people—some disabled people require the structure of offices to
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flourish at work, while some people may find online workplaces more accessible. Finally,
disabled people might be at risk of being further excluded as more services go online. It
is well-established that many disabled people lack access to the internet or other
technology needs.264 Moreover, many websites are not accessible to all disabled people.
Therefore, the drive to move more services online therefore might disadvantage disabled
people going forward.
5. Conclusion
This project has established the following thesis—American disability law and
policy is driven by naïve integrationism. Disabled people are presumptively integrated by
law, but they are not provided with the necessary supports that they need to then thrive in
integrated settings. In fact, many of these services and supports have been cut since the
ADA was passed in 1990. However, this is not cause for dismay—imaginative cause
lawyering and sensible policy are bringing courts and municipalities beyond naïve
integrationism. The process is slow and piecemeal; however, this project has laid out a set
of policy proposals and litigation strategies that disability advocates are using and can use
going forward.
Our choice is not a false dichotomy between naïve integration and supported
segregation—rather through a policy of presumptive integration coupled with supports,
we can more effectively realize the idea of integration and therefore advance the cause of
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disability justice. Supported integration operates as an alternative to naïve integration and
supported segregation. Policies that have been discussed throughout this project, such as
supported housing, community-based mental health services, supported employment, and
the increased use of paraprofessionals in education can all fundamentally reshape how
services are provided, thus allowing for the same types of supportive services provided in
segregated settings to be provided in the community. These services, as I have argued,
are necessary to ensure that people living in the community have a free and equal
opportunity to participate in society on an equal basis as others—as I have argued, with
presumptively segregated settings comes a lack of choice regarding when and how to
receive supportive services. Through smart litigation coupled with systemic policy
change, we can make piecemeal changes to the ways in which disability services are
provided, ones that advance the cause of disability justice.
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